Judgment aggregation and minimal change: a model of consensus formation by belief revision

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Abstract

When a group of agents attempts to reach an agreement on certain issues, it is usually desirable that the resulting consensus be as close as possible to the original judgments of the individuals. However, when these judgments are logically connected to further beliefs, the notion of closeness should also take into account to what extent the individuals would have to revise their entire belief set to reach an agreement. In this work, we present a model for generation of agreement with respect to a given agenda which allows individual epistemic entrenchment to influence the value of the consensus. While the postulates for the transformation function and their construction resemble those of AGM belief revision, the notion of an agenda is adapted from the theory of judgment aggregation. This allows our model to connect both frameworks.

Keywords

Judgment aggregation Belief revision Consensus formation Distance-based aggregation 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Franz Dietrich and two anonymous referees very much for their detailed and constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am very grateful to Olivier Roy for his extensive feedback and support. Part of this research has been supported by the DFG-GARC research project SEGA (RO 4548/6-1).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of BayreuthBayreuthGermany

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