Abstract
In this note, it is shown that in a Bayesian model with unawareness of impossible (probability zero), or vanishingly improbable, events, awareness can only change after such an improbable event has actually been observed.
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Quiggin, J. Dynamic awareness and zero probability beliefs. Theory Decis 83, 309–313 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9580-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9580-x