Theory and Decision

, Volume 81, Issue 1, pp 101–121

Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty

  • Nobuyuki Hanaki
  • Nicolas Jacquemet
  • Stéphane Luchini
  • Adam Zylbersztejn
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9525-9

Cite this article as:
Hanaki, N., Jacquemet, N., Luchini, S. et al. Theory Decis (2016) 81: 101. doi:10.1007/s11238-015-9525-9

Abstract

How is one’s cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple \(2 \times 2\) dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability.

Keywords

Strategic uncertainty Bounded rationality Robot  Experiment 

Funding information

Funder NameGrant NumberFunding Note
Agence Nationale de la Recherche
  • 11-FRJA-0002
Agence Nationale de la Recherche
  • 11-LABX-0042
Agence Nationale de la Recherche
  • 11-IDEX-007

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nobuyuki Hanaki
    • 1
    • 2
  • Nicolas Jacquemet
    • 3
  • Stéphane Luchini
    • 4
  • Adam Zylbersztejn
    • 5
    • 6
  1. 1.GREDEGUniversité Nice Sophia AntipolisValbonneFrance
  2. 2.Skema Business SchoolSophia AntipolisFrance
  3. 3.Paris School of Economics and University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Centre d’Economie de la SorbonneParisFrance
  4. 4.Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESSMarseilleFrance
  5. 5.Université de Lyon and Université de Lyon 2LyonFrance
  6. 6.CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-EtienneEcullyFrance

Personalised recommendations