Theory and Decision

, Volume 80, Issue 3, pp 451–462 | Cite as

Optimal stealing time

  • Andrea GalliceEmail author


We study a dynamic game in which players can steal parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The effectiveness of a player’s theft is a random function which is stochastically increasing in the share of the pie the agent currently owns. We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals change with the number of players involved in the game and investigate the conditions that lead to the occurrence of symmetric or asymmetric equilibria.


Stealing Stochastic games Optimal timing Pie allocation 



I thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that substantially improved the paper. I am also grateful to Pascal Courty, Dino Gerardi, Edoardo Grillo, Dorothea Kubler, Vilen Lipatov, Marco Mariotti, Ignacio Monzon, and Karl Schlag for useful suggestions and discussions. All remaining errors are my own.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and StatisticsUniversity of Torino and Collegio Carlo AlbertoTorinoItaly

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