Make-up and suspicion in bargaining with cheap talk: An experiment controlling for gender and gender constellation
- 302 Downloads
This paper explores gender differences in “make-up” and “suspicion” in a bargaining game in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for the company. “Make-up” is measured by how much the true value is overstated, “suspicion” by how much the price offer differs from the value message. We run different computerized treatments varying in information about the gender (constellation) and in embeddedness of gender information. The asymmetry of the game and of information allows for a robust assessment of gender (constellation) effects. We report here the results from just one shot round decision since we expect such effects to be more pronounced for inexperienced participants. We mainly find an effect of gender constellation: when female sellers are aware to confront a female buyer, they overstate more, i.e. there is more “make-up”. However, we cannot confirm gender (constellation) effects for suspicion.
KeywordsBargaining Cheap-talk Experiment Gender
We would like to thank the Max Planck Institute of Jena for funding and supporting this research.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.
- Ayres, I., & Siegelman, P. (1995). Race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car. American Economic Review, 85(3), 304–321.Google Scholar
- Buss, D. M. (Ed.). (2005). The handbook of evolutionary psycology. Hoboken: Wiley.Google Scholar
- Di Cagno, D., Galliera, A., Güth, W., Pace, N., & Panaccione, L. (2015). Experience and gender effects in an acquiring-a-company experiment allowing for value messages. Princeton: Mimeo.Google Scholar
- Greiner, B. (2004). The online recruitment system orsee 2.0-a guide for the organization of experiments in economics, University of Cologne. Working Paper Series in Economics, 10(23), 63–104.Google Scholar
- Güth, W., Pull K., Stadler, M., & Zaby A. (2014). Compulsory disclosure of private information: Theoretical and experimental results for the “Acquiring-a-Company” Game, In Jena Economic Research Paper 2014–003.Google Scholar
- Riley, B.H., & McGinn, K.L. (2002). When does gender matter in negotiation? Working Paper Series rwp02-036, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.Google Scholar
- Samuelson, W.F., & Bazerman, M. H. (1985). Negotiation under the winner’s curse. In Smith, V. (Ed.) Research in experimental economics, Vol. III.Google Scholar