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Cooperative games with homogeneous groups of participants

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Abstract

We consider a class of games, which we call “groups’ games”, in which players are partitioned into classes within which players may be considered indistinguishable. We compute explicit formulas for some of the principal values restricted to these games. This is particularly useful for dealing with games with a large number of players where the usual formulas would be impractical (or impossible) to compute. We give several examples that illustrate how this idea may be applied to concrete situations.

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Acknowledgments

Authors acknowledge support from research grant 167924 from CONACyT.

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Correspondence to Francisco Sánchez-Sánchez.

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Hernández-Lamoneda, L., Sánchez-Sánchez, F. Cooperative games with homogeneous groups of participants. Theory Decis 79, 451–461 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9474-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9474-8

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