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An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

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Abstract

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Theo Driessen

  2. Department of Economics, National Cheng Kung University, 70101, Tainan, Taiwan

    Cheng-Cheng Hu

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  1. Theo Driessen
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  2. Cheng-Cheng Hu
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Correspondence to Cheng-Cheng Hu.

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Driessen, T., Hu, CC. An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance. Theory Decis 74, 1–12 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1

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