Theory and Decision

, Volume 75, Issue 1, pp 101–116 | Cite as

Why do groups cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks?

Article

Abstract

Previous research has discovered a curious phenomenon: groups cooperate less than individuals in a deterministic prisoner’s dilemma game, but cooperate more than individuals when uncertainty is introduced into the game. We conducted two studies to examine three possible processes that might drive groups to be more cooperative than individuals in reducing risks: group risk concern, group cooperation expectation, and pressure to conform to social norms. We found that ex post guilt aversion and ex-post blame avoidance cause group members to be more risk concerned than individuals under uncertainty. These concerns drive groups to choose the cooperation (and risk-reduction) strategy more frequently than individuals. Groups also have higher cooperation expectations for their corresponding groups than individuals have for their corresponding individuals. We found no evidence of pressure to conform to social norms driving groups to be more cooperative than individuals.

Keywords

Group decision Uncertainty Risk Cooperation Experimental economics Interdependent security 

JEL Classification

D81 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Altisource TMWinston SalemUSA
  2. 2.Department of PsychologyUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA
  3. 3.Wharton SchoolUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA

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