Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
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This article investigates the relationship among the weak Pareto principle, the strong Pareto principle, and positive responsiveness in the context of voting. First, it is shown that under a mild domain condition, if an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule (CCR) is complete and transitive, then the weak Pareto principle and the strong Pareto principle are equivalent. Next, it is shown that under another mild domain condition, if a neutral CCR is transitive, then the strong Pareto principle and positive responsiveness are equivalent. By applying these results, we obtain a new characterization of the method of majority decision.
KeywordsWeak Pareto principle Strong Pareto principle Anonymity Neutrality Positive responsiveness Method of majority decision
JEL ClassificationD70 D71
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