Theory and Decision

, Volume 71, Issue 4, pp 503–518 | Cite as

Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions

  • Susumu CatoEmail author


This article investigates the relationship among the weak Pareto principle, the strong Pareto principle, and positive responsiveness in the context of voting. First, it is shown that under a mild domain condition, if an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule (CCR) is complete and transitive, then the weak Pareto principle and the strong Pareto principle are equivalent. Next, it is shown that under another mild domain condition, if a neutral CCR is transitive, then the strong Pareto principle and positive responsiveness are equivalent. By applying these results, we obtain a new characterization of the method of majority decision.


Weak Pareto principle Strong Pareto principle Anonymity Neutrality Positive responsiveness Method of majority decision 

JEL Classification

D70 D71 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social ScienceThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan

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