Theory and Decision

, Volume 70, Issue 4, pp 529–546 | Cite as

Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets

  • Andreas TuticEmail author
  • Stefan Pfau
  • André Casajus


We present experimental data on a simple market game. Several solution concepts from cooperative game theory are applied to predict the observed payoff distributions. Notably, a recently introduced solution concept meant to capture the influence of outside options on the payoff distribution within groups fares better than most other solution concepts under consideration. Our results shed some light on the effects of scarcity relations on markets on bargaining outcomes within negotiating dyads.


TU games Outside options Experiment Gloves game 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andreas Tutic
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
    Email author
  • Stefan Pfau
    • 3
  • André Casajus
    • 1
    • 2
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches InstitutLeipzigGermany
  2. 2.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche FakultätUniversität LeipzigLeipzigGermany
  3. 3.Institut für SoziologieUniversität LeipzigLeipzigGermany
  4. 4.IMW Institute of Mathematical EconomicsBielefeld UniversityBielefeldGermany
  5. 5.Chair of Economics and Information SystemsHHL Leipzig Graduate School of ManagementLeipzigGermany

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