Abstract
The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which summarizes the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed by Elga (Analysis 60:143–147, 2000) and Lewis (Analysis 61:171–176, 2001) differ by a single parameter concerning her prior probability. They can be supported by considering, respectively, that Sleeping Beauty is “fuzzy-minded” and “blank-minded”, the first interpretation being more natural than the second. The traditional absent-minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga’s solution.
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Baratgin, J., Walliser, B. Sleeping Beauty and the absent-minded driver. Theory Decis 69, 489–496 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9215-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9215-6