Theory and Decision

, Volume 71, Issue 4, pp 461–472

Making statements and approval voting



We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.


Approval voting Turnout 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Enriqueta Aragones
    • 1
  • Itzhak Gilboa
    • 2
    • 3
  • Andrew Weiss
    • 4
  1. 1.Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, C.S.I.C.BarcelonaSpain
  2. 2.Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael
  3. 3.Department of Economics and Decision Sciences HECParisFrance
  4. 4.Department of EconomicsBoston UniversityBostonUSA

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