Making statements and approval voting
- First Online:
- 87 Downloads
We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.
KeywordsApproval voting Turnout
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Brams S. J., Fishburn P. C. (1983) Approval voting. Birkhauser, BostonGoogle Scholar
- D’Amasio A. (1994) Descartes’ error. Putnam, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- Downs A. (1957) An economic theory of democracy. Harper Collins Publishers, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- Frank R. H. (1988) Passions within reason: The strategic role of emotions. Norton, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- LeDoux J. E. (1996) The emotional brain. Simon and Schuster, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- Lohmann S. (1994) Information aggregation through costly political action. American Economic Review 84(3): 518–530Google Scholar
- Pennebaker J. W., Barger S. D., Tiebout J. (1989) Disclosure of traumas and health among holocaust survivors. Psychosomatic Medicine 51: 577–589Google Scholar