In a multilateral bargaining game where a proposer and responders can set up a “principal–agent” relationship by means of binding cash-offer contracts, we show that there is a Markov SPE with a delay in reaching an agreement. We also show that all the individually rational and efficient payoffs can be supported by SPE.
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Chen, YC., Luo, X. Delay in a bargaining game with contracts. Theory Decis 65, 339–353 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9111-5
- Game theory
- Multilateral bargaining