Reliability of Information Aggregation with Regional Biases: A Note


Is there a rationale for an electoral college system or do these voting systems always waste useful information? This paper studies this question in a setup in which voting is supposed to aggregate decentralized information about individual preferences for two candidates. Individual perceptions may be affected by regional information. When such regional information plays a major role, an electoral college system may be superior to simple majority voting.

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Correspondence to Hans Peter Grüner.

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A previous version of this paper has appeared as CEPR Dp. No. 3371.

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Behm, M., Grüner, H.P. Reliability of Information Aggregation with Regional Biases: A Note. Theory Decis 66, 355–371 (2009).

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  • information aggregation
  • democracy
  • electoral college
  • popular vote

JEL Code Classification

  • D72