Abstract
We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.
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Menezes, F., Quiggin, J. Games without Rules. Theor Decis 63, 315–347 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9042-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9042-6