Theory and Decision

, Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 1–40 | Cite as

The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas

  • Aki Lehtinen


This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types.


agendas counterbalancing simulation strategic voting welfare 

Jel Classification Numbers

D71 D81 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Social and Moral PhilosophyUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland

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