Uncommon Priors Require Origin Disputes

Abstract

In standard belief models, priors are always common knowledge. This prevents such models from representing agents’ probabilistic beliefs about the origins of their priors. By embedding standard models in a larger standard model, however, pre-priors can describe such beliefs. When an agent’s prior and pre-prior are mutually consistent, he must believe that his prior would only have been different in situations where relevant event chances were different, but that variations in other agents’ priors are otherwise completely unrelated to which events are how likely. Due to this, Bayesians who agree enough about the origins of their priors must have the same priors.

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Correspondence to Robin Hanson.

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Hanson, R. Uncommon Priors Require Origin Disputes. Theor Decis 61, 319–328 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9004-4

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Keywords

  • origin
  • common prior
  • disagree
  • Bayesian