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Theory and Decision

, Volume 61, Issue 2, pp 93–128 | Cite as

Does Learning Diminish Violations of Independence, Coalescing and Monotonicity?

  • Steven J. HumphreyEmail author
Article

Abstract

Violations of expected utility theory are sometimes attributed to imprecise preferences interacting with a lack of learning opportunity in the experimental laboratory. This paper reports an experimental test of whether a learning opportunity which engenders accurate probability assessments, by enhancing understanding of the meaning of stated probability information, causes anomalous behaviour to diminish. The data show that whilst in some cases expected utility maximising behaviour increases with the learning opportunity, so too do systematic violations. Therefore, there should be no presumption that anomalous behaviour under risk is transient and that discovered preferences will be appropriately described by expected utility theory.

Keywords

discovered preferences event-splitting effects independence monotonicity probability learning 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of EconomicsUniversity of NottinghamNottinghamUK

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