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Formation of a Communication Network Under Perfect Foresight

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Abstract

We study the formation of a communication network under perfect foresight. We show the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between the cost of link formation and the total number of links created in stable networks. This result enhances a dilemma between stable and efficient networks.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. EconomiX, Université Paris X, Batiment K, 200, avenue de la République, 92001, Nanterre, France

    Frédéric Deroïan

  2. GREQAM: Vieille Charité, 2, rue de la Charité, 13002, Marseille, France

    Frédéric Deroïan

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  1. Frédéric Deroïan
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Correspondence to Frédéric Deroïan.

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Deroïan, F. Formation of a Communication Network Under Perfect Foresight. Theor Decis 61, 191–204 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-0004-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-0004-1

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