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Communication Protocols with Belief Messages

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Abstract

This paper presents a communication protocol to reach consensus. In our setting, every player has asymmetric information and evaluates a fixed event on his information. According to the protocol, the sender sends non-partitional messages that he believes the event with a probability of at least his evaluation. We show that the posteriors for the event must be equal among the players after the communication. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C62, C78.

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Correspondence to Ryuichiro Ishikawa.

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Ishikawa, R. Communication Protocols with Belief Messages. Theor Decis 61, 63–74 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6013-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6013-7

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