Abstract
Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.
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Berden, C., Peters, H. On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games. Theor Decis 60, 359–370 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-3986-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-3986-1