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Policy Stable States in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

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Abstract

A new approach to policy analysis is formulated within the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution. A policy is defined as a plan of action for a decision maker (DM) that specifies the DM’s intended action starting at every possible state in a graph model of a conflict. Given a profile of policies, a Policy Stable State (PSS) is a state that no DM moves away from (according to its policy), and such that no DM would prefer to change its policy given the policies of the other DMs. The profile of policies associated to a PSS is called a Policy Equilibrium. Properties of PSSs are developed, and a refinement is suggested that restricts DMs to policies that are credible in that they are in the DM’s immediate interest. Relationships with existing stability definitions in the graph model for conflict resolution are then explored.

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Correspondence to Dao-Zhi Zeng.

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Zeng, DZ., Fang, L., Hipel, K.W. et al. Policy Stable States in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. Theor Decis 57, 345–365 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-2459-x

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