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Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations

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Abstract

In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances.

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REFERENCES

  • Denti, E. and Prati, N. (2001), An algorithm for winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations, Decisions in Economics and Finance 24, 153–158.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Elettronica, Informatica e Sistemistica, Universita' di Bologna, Viale Risorgimento 2, Italia

    Enrico Denti

  2. Dipartimento Finanza dell' Impresa e dei Mercati Finanziari, Universita' di Udine, Via Tomadini 30/a, Italia

    Nando Prati

Authors
  1. Enrico Denti
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  2. Nando Prati
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Denti, E., Prati, N. Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations. Theory and Decision 56, 183–192 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5644-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5644-4

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