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Dynamic Coalition Formation in the Apex Game

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Fukuda, E., Muto, S. Dynamic Coalition Formation in the Apex Game. Theory and Decision 56, 153–163 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5642-6

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