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The dynamic stability of coalitionist behaviour for two-strategy bimatrix games

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Cressman, R., Garay, J., Scarelli, A. et al. The dynamic stability of coalitionist behaviour for two-strategy bimatrix games. Theory and Decision 56, 141–152 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5641-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5641-7

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