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Monotonicity of power and power measures

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Abstract

Monotonicity is commonly considered an essential requirement for power measures; violation of local monotonicity or related postulates supposedly disqualifies an index as a valid yardstick for measuring power. This paper questions if such claims are really warranted. In the light of features of real-world collective decision making such as coalition formation processes, ideological affinities, a priori unions, and strategic interaction, standard notions of monotonicity are too narrowly defined. A power measure should be able to indicate that power is non-monotonic in a given dimension of players' resources if – given a decision environment and plausible assumptions about behaviour – itis non-monotonic.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of SocioEconomics (IAW), University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, Germany

    Manfred J. Holler & Stefan Napel

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  1. Manfred J. Holler
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  2. Stefan Napel
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Holler, M.J., Napel, S. Monotonicity of power and power measures. Theory and Decision 56, 93–111 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5638-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5638-2

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