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Encouraging a coalition formation

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  1. Department of Mathematics and The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)

    Michael Maschler

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  1. Michael Maschler
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Maschler, M. Encouraging a coalition formation. Theory and Decision 56, 25–34 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5631-9

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