Abstract
This is a brief historical note on game theory. We cover its historical roots (prior to its formal definition in 1944), and look at its development until the late 1960's.
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Gambarelli, G., Owen, G. The Coming of Game Theory. Theory and Decision 56, 1–18 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5629-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5629-3