Skip to main content

The problem of perceptual invariance

Abstract

It is a familiar experience to perceive a material object as maintaining a stable shape even though it projects differently shaped images on our retina as we move with respect to it, or as maintaining a stable color throughout changes in the way the object is illuminated. We also perceive sounds as maintaining constant timbre and loudness when the context and the spatial relations between us and the sound source change over time. But where does this perceptual invariance ‘come from’? What is it about our perceptual systems that makes them able to ‘transform’ incoming unstable and fluctuating sensory inputs into generally stable and coherent conscious experiences? And what exactly do we experience as invariant in cases like those described above? There are two main approaches to the Problem of Perceptual Invariance: the Local-Inferential approach and the Global-Structural approach. Although both approaches include an account of the sub-personal perceptual mechanisms ‘stabilizing’ variant and invariant components in incoming sensory stimulation and a proposal regarding the phenomenology of perceptual invariance, in this paper I argue that the latter provides a better solution to the problem overall.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Notes

  1. 1.

    What I called the problem of perceptual invariance should be distinguished from the more commonly discussed ‘problem of Perception’ (cfr. Crane & French, 2017), even though some philosophers, most famously A. D. Smith (2002) and Alva Noë (2004, 2012), tried to combine them and provide a unified solution. As I see it, the problem of perceptual invariance is more circumscribed than the problem of perception. While the latter concerns the nature of the relationship between perceptual experience and the mind-independent world and, relatedly, the nature of perceptual states (e.g. relational or representational), the former has to do with only one specific aspect of perceptual experience: perceptual invariance. Additionally, while the problem of perception does not involve reference to the mechanisms underlying perceptual experience, the problem of perceptual invariance concerns both the level of perceptual phenomenology and the level of mechanisms. The mechanisms in question are usually known as ‘perceptual constancies’.

  2. 2.

    Although I am aware that some theories of perception do not consider what happens at the level of perceptual systems to be relevant for their explanatory goals, I will not discuss such views here.

  3. 3.

    See Buccella & Chemero (unpublished) for more on this.

  4. 4.

    Of course, on the assumption that accounting for more cases in a unified manner is itself a theoretical virtue.

  5. 5.

    One major commitment of this type of views is that, because of the ambiguity of proximal stimuli, perception of how things are independently of us must depend on a capacity to ‘construct’ a representation of the object and its properties which can be kept ‘fixed’ throughout changes in contextual and perceiver-dependent elements over time. Also, it should be acknowledged that there are slight differences among individual views within the traditional framework. For instance, Rock (1975, 1977) following Helmholtz and his ‘unconscious inference’ account of how the visual system transforms proximal subjective sensations into distal object representations, holds that proximal stimuli should be considered an ‘early stage’ of perceptual processing. According to Rock, the role of proximal stimulation is to provide one of the two ‘premises’ of an unconscious inference-like procedure which has the (possibly accurate) attribution of a specific property to an object as its ‘conclusion’, the other premise usually being an abstract rule or principle (itself ‘located’ somewhere in the brain) which ‘tells’ the visual system how to interpret the proximal stimulus. As Gilchrist (2012) notices, the idea that perception (and perceptual constancy) should be understood as a process consisting in two separate stages (i.e. sensory stimulation and rule-based interpretation) was very much opposed by the Gestalt psychologists (Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 1947). However, criticisms to this idea have come from within the tradition, too. For example, Burge (2010) rejects the existence of (explicitly or implicitly) represented ‘inferential rules’ in the brain according to which we interpret proximal stimuli.

  6. 6.

    Pagano and Cabe (2003) showed that subjects can estimate the length of a hand-held rod by simply waving it around and relying on feedback from their arm muscles and tendons. Their suggestion is that the proprioceptive and kinaesthetic systems are directly tracking a relational feature of the arm-rod system, namely its moment of inertia, i.e. an object’s resistance to rotation along one dimension.

  7. 7.

    Instead of considering incorrect weight judgments in the illusion as the result of an erroneous mental computation, they showed how weight judgments of objects of equal size and weight varied according to the objects’ different distribution of such weight.

  8. 8.

    In a more conciliatory spirit, Davies (2016) argues that color matching experiments support a pluralist view, where color constancy is sometimes traditional, and sometimes relational. I will not discuss Davies’s view in this paper, but my main reason to resist pluralism is that, when we look at other constancies beyond color, the traditional view encounters difficulties (as the next section argues). This fact, together with a desire to provide a unified account of all the constancies across sense modalities, makes me inclined to put all my eggs in the relational basket. It should also be noted that in a more recent paper, Davies defends a new theory of color vision which has been gaining popularity in both science and philosophy. Roughly, this theory claims that representation of color relations, understood in particular as chromatic contrast properties (in the form of a ‘holistic’ iconic representation of edges separating colored surfaces) is more primitive than representation of monadic color properties (Davies, 2020). This view is supported by several studies involving patients diagnosed with cerebral achromatopsia, a condition that makes subjects visual experience completely achromatic. Despite their inability to see monadic colors, some achromatopsic patients are nonetheless apparently able to visually perceive local contrasts and discriminate among different appearances of edges (Kentridge, Heywood et al., 2004a; Kentridge, Cole et al., 2004b). If this is right, then we might have a further reason to privilege a relational view of color constancy based on the very functioning of color vision.

  9. 9.

    When presenting the experiment’s results, Foster warns that “it is unlikely that either will look like a match to the reader because they are not seen in the experimental conditions of controlled illumination.” (2003, p. 440).

  10. 10.

    For example, Maloney and colleagues (Maloney, 1986, 2003; Maloney and Wandell 1986) propose a method to solve the inverse problem of color constancy which exploits the fact that there are more combinations of receptors on the retina than there are possible surface reflection profiles, while others (e.g. Golz and MacLeod 2002; Brainard et al., 2006; Brainard and Freeman 1997) appeal to higher-order scene statistics and Bayesian models.

  11. 11.

    E.g. Hilbert, (1987), Byrne & Hilbert (2003), Tye (2000).

  12. 12.

    I do not consider the authors discussed in this section as endorsing GS or even being involved in the debate about invariance as I set it up. Rather, I see the arguments discussed in this section more as external allies of GS, as they undermine what I take to be the strongest source of support for LI.

  13. 13.

    By “the same blouse” here I mean “a qualitatively identical blouse”.

  14. 14.

    For more psychological studies supporting the claim that the visual system has a ‘preference’ for structure as opposed to invariant 3D shape representation, see Guan and Firestone (2019) and Lowet et al. (2018).

  15. 15.

    For a recent discussion of the topic in the context of a philosophical theory of perception, see Schellenberg (2018, 2019).

References

  1. Amano, K., Foster, D. H., & Nascimento, S. M. C. (2005). Minimalist surface-colour matching. Perception, 34(8), 1009–1013. https://doi.org/10.1068/p5185

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Amano, K., Foster, D. H., & Nascimento, S. M. C. (2006). Color constancy in natural scenes with and without an explicit illuminant cue. Visual Neuroscience, 23, 351–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Amazeen, E. L., & Turvey, M. T. (1996). Weight perception and the haptic size–weight illusion are functions of the inertia tensor. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 22, 213–232. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.22.1.213

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Arend, L., & Reeves, A. (1986). Simultaneous color constancy. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 3(10), 1743–1751.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Balasubramaniam, R., Riley, M. A., & Turvey, M. T. (2000). Specificity of postural sway to the demands of a precision task. Gait & Posture, 11(1), 12–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0966-6362(99)00051-X

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Bizley, J. K., & Cohen, Y. E. (2013). The what, where, and how of auditory-object perception. Nature reviews Neuroscience, 14, 693–707.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Blackmore, S. (2002). There is no stream of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 17–28.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Boundy-Singer, Z. M., Saal, H. P., & Bensmaia, S. J. (2017). Speed invariance of tactile texture perception. Journal of Neurophysiology, 118(4), 2371–2377. https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00161.2017

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Brainard, D. H. (1998). Color constancy in the nearly natural image 2. Achromatic loci. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 15(2), 307–325.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Brainard, D., & Freeman, W. T. (1997). Bayesian color constancy. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 14(7), 1393–1411. https://doi.org/10.1364/JOSAA.14.001393.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Brainard, D., Longere, P., Delahunt, P., Freeman, W., Kraft, J., & Xiao, B. (2006). Bayesian model of human color constancy. Journal of Vision, 6, 1267–1281. https://doi.org/10.1167/6.11.10.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Bregman, A. S. (1990). Auditory scene analysis: the perceptual organization of sound. MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  13. Brown, R. (2003). Backgrounds and illuminants: the yin and yang of color constancy. In R. Mausfeld & D. Heyer (Eds.), Colour perception – mind and the physical world (pp. 247–272). Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Bruce, V., Green, P. R., & Georgeson, M. A. (1996). Visual perception, physiology, psychology, and ecology. Taylor and Francis.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Burge, T. (2010). Origins of objectivity. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  16. Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. R. (2003). Color realism and color science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26, 3–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Carello, C., & Turvey, M. T. (2004). Physics and Psychology of the Muscle Sense. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.01301007.x.

  18. Charpentier, A. (1891). Analyse experimentale de quelques elements de la sensation de poids. Archives Physiologiques Normales and Pathologiques, 18, 79–87.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  20. Chirimuuta, M. (2008). Reflectance realism and colour constancy: what would count as scientific evidence for Hilbert’s ontology of colour? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(4), 563–582.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Chirimuuta, M. (2015). Outside Color. MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  22. Cicerone, C. M., Hoffman, D. D., Gowdy, P., & Kim, J. (1995). The perception of color from motion. Perception and Psychophysics, 57, 761–777.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Clark, A. (2012). Dreaming the whole cat: generative models, predictive processing, and the enactivist conception of perceptual experience. Mind, 121(483), 753–771.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Clark, A. (2016). Surfing uncertainty: prediction, action, and the embodied mind. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  25. Cohen, J. (2015). Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 22, 1512–1518.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Comte, Auguste. (1830). Cours de philosophie positive (Vol. 1). Bacheleier, Libraire pour les Mathématiques.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Crane, T., French, C. (2017). The Problem of Perception, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/perception-problem/>.

  28. Darici, O., Temeltas, H., & Kuo, A. D. (2020). Anticipatory control of momentum for bipedal walking on uneven Terrain. Scientific Reports, 10(1), 540. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-57156-6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Davies, W. (2016). Color constancy, illumination, and matching. Philosophy of Science, 83, 540–562.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. Davies, W. (2020). Colour relations in form. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 00, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12679

    Article  Google Scholar 

  31. Dewey, J. (1896). The reflex arc conceot in psychology. The Psychological Review, 3(4), 357–370.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. Elliott, T. M., Hamilton, L. S., & Theunissen, F. E. (2013). Acoustic structure of the five perceptual dimensions of timbre in orchestral instrument tones. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 133(1), 389–404.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. Fodor, J. A. (1984). Observation reconsidered. Philosophy of Science, 51(1), 23–43. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/6765.003.0014.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Fodor, J. A. (1990). A theory of content and other essays. The MIT Press.

  35. Foster, D. H. (2003). Does colour constancy exist? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(10), 439–443.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  36. Foster, D. H., & Nascimento, S. M. C. (1994). Relational Colour Constancy from Invariant Cone-Excitation Ratios (Vol. 257).

  37. Gibson, James J. (1950). The perception of the visual world. Houghton Mifflin.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Gibson, James J. (1966). The senses considered ad perceptual systems. Houghton Mifflin.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Gibson, James J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Gibson, J. J., & Crooks, L. E. (1938). A theoretical field-analysis of automobile-driving. The American Journal of Psychology, 51, 453–471. https://doi.org/10.2307/1416145

    Article  Google Scholar 

  41. Gilchrist, A. (2012). Objective and subjective sides of perception. In G. Hatfield & S. Allred (Eds.), Visual experience – sensation, cognition, and constancy (pp. 105–121). Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  42. Gładziejewski, P. (2016). Predictive coding and representationalism. Synthese, 193(2), 559–582.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  43. Golz, J., & MacLeod, D. I. A. (2002). Influence of scene statistics on colour constancy. Nature, 415(6872), 637–640.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  44. Granrud, C. E. (2009). Development of size constancy in children: a test of the metacognitive theory. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 71(3), 644–654. https://doi.org/10.3758/APP.71.3.644

    Article  Google Scholar 

  45. Granrud, C. E. (2012). Strategy use in size judgments. In G. Hatfield & S. Allred (Eds.), Visual experience – sensation, cognition, and constancy (pp. 13–34). Oxford University Press (OUP).

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  46. Granrud, C. E., & Shmechel, T. N. (2006). Development of size constancy in children: a test of the proximal mode sensitivity hypothesis. Perception and Psychophysics, 68, 1372–1381.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  47. Green, E. J. (2019). On the perception of structure. Noûs, 53(3), 564–592. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12207

    Article  Google Scholar 

  48. Griffiths, T. D., & Warren, J. D. (2004). What is an auditory object? Nature reviews Neuroscience, 5, 887–892.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  49. Guan, C., & Firestone, C. (2019). Seeing what’s possible: disconnected visual parts are confused for their potential wholes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1(999), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000658

    Article  Google Scholar 

  50. Hatfield, G. (2009). On perceptual constancy. In G. Hatfield (Ed.), Perception and cognition: essays in the philosophy of psychology (pp. 178–211). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Hatfield, G. (2012). Phenomenal and cognitive factors in spatial perception. In G. Hatfield & S. Allred (Eds.), Visual experience – sensation, cognition, and constancy (pp. 35–62). Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  52. Heald, S. L. M., Van Hedger, S. C., & Nusbaum, H. C. (2017). Perceptual plasticity for auditory object recognition. Front. Psychol, 8, 781.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  53. Hering, E. (1878). Grundzüge der Lehre vom Lichtsinn. Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Hilbert, D. R. (1987). Color and color perception: a study in anthropocentric realism. CSLI.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Hochberg, J. (1988). Visual perception. In R. Atkinson (Ed.), Stevens’ handbook of experimental psychology. Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001

    Article  Google Scholar 

  57. Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. MIT Press.

  58. Isaac, A. (2017). Prospects for timbre physicalism. Philosophical Studies, 175, 503–529.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  59. James, W. (2007). The Principles of Psychology. Cosimo Classics.

  60. Jones, L. A. (2003). Perceptual constancy and the perceived magnitude of muscle forces. Experimental Brain Research, 151, 197–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  61. Kelly, S. D. (1999). What do we see when we do? In T. Baldwin (Ed.), Philosophical Topics, (Vol. 27, Issue 2). Routledge

  62. Kentridge, R. W., Heywood, C. A., & Cowey, A. (2004a). Chromatic edges, surfaces and constancies in cerebral achromatopsia. Neuropsychologia, 42(6), 821–830. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.11.002

    Article  Google Scholar 

  63. Kentridge, R. W., Cole, G. G., & Heywood, C. A. B. T.-P. in B. R. (2004b). The primacy of chromatic edge processing in normal and cerebrally achromatopsic subjects. In The roots of visual awareness: a festschrift in honour of Alan Cowey (Vol. 144, pp. 161–169). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-6123(03)14411-1.

  64. Khan, S., & Chang, R. (2013). Anatomy of the vestibular system: a review. NeuroRehabilitation, 32(3), 437–443.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  65. Kiefte, M., & Kluender, K. R. (2008). Absorption of reliable spectral characteristics in auditory perception. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 123(1), 366–376. https://doi.org/10.1121/1.2804951

    Article  Google Scholar 

  66. Koffka, K. (1935). Principles of gestalt psychology. Harcourt, Brace & World.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Kohler, W. (1947). Gestalt psychology. Liveright.

    Google Scholar 

  68. Lee, D. N., & Lishman, J. R. (1975). Visual proprioceptive control of stance. Journal of Human Movement Studies, 1(2), 87–95.

    Google Scholar 

  69. Lee, David N., & Reddish, P. E. (1981). Plummeting gannets: a paradigm of ecological optics. Nature, 293(5830), 293–294. https://doi.org/10.1038/293293a0

    Article  Google Scholar 

  70. Lee, D. N. (2011). How movement is guided. Retrieved from http://www.pmarc.ed.ac.uk/ideas/pdf/HowMovtGuided100311.pdf

  71. Lowet, A. S., Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2018). Seeing structure: shape skeletons modulate perceived similarity. Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics, 80(5), 1278–1289. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-017-1457-8

    Article  Google Scholar 

  72. Maloney, L. T. (1986). Evaluation of linear models of surface spectral reflectance with small numbers of parameters. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 3, 1673–1683.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  73. Maloney, L. (2003). Surface colour perception and environmental constraints. In R. Mausfeld & D. Heyer (Eds.), Colour perception – mind and the physical world (pp. 279–300). Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  74. Maloney, L. T., & Wandell, B. A. (1986). Color constancy: a method for recovering surface spectral reflectance. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 3(1), 29–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  75. Massion, J. (1994). Postural control system. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 4(6), 877–887. https://doi.org/10.1016/0959-4388(94)90137-6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  76. Matherne, S. (2017). Merleau-ponty on style as the key to perceptual presence and constancy. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 55(4), 693–727. https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2017.0071

    Article  Google Scholar 

  77. Matthen, M., & Rescorla, M. (2015). Bayesian Perceptual Psychology. In M. Matthen (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception.

  78. Mausfeld, R. (2003). ‘Color’ as part of the format of different perceptual primitives: the dual coding of color. In R. Mausfeld & D. Heyer (Eds.), Color perception: mind and physical world (pp. 381–430). Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  79. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). The structure of behavior. Beacon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  80. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). In J. M. Edie & W. Cobb (Eds.), The primacy of perception and other essays on phenomenological psychology, the philosophy of art, history and politics. Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  81. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  82. Metzger, W. (1930). Optische Untersuchungen am Ganzfeld. Psychologische Forschung, 13(1), 6–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  83. Nascimento, S. M. C., de Almeida, V. M. N., Fiadeiro, P. T., & Foster, D. H. (2005). Effect of complexity on colour constancy with real three-dimensional scenes and objects. Perception, 34, 947–950.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  84. Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  85. Noë, A. (2012). Varieties of presence. Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  86. Pagano, C. C., & Cabe, P. A. (2003). Constancy in dynamic touch: length perceived by dynamic touch is invariant over changes in media. Ecological Psychology, 15, 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  87. Rescorla, M. (2015). Bayesian perceptual psychology. In M. Matthen (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of perception. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.010.

  88. Riley, M. A., Kuznetsov, N., & Bonnette, S. (2011). State-, parameter-, and graph-dynamics: constraints and the distillation of postural control systems. Science & Motricité, 74, 5–18. https://doi.org/10.1051/sm/2011117

    Article  Google Scholar 

  89. Rock, I. (1975). Introduction to perception. Macmillan Publishing Co.

    Google Scholar 

  90. Rock, I. (1977). In defense of unconscious inference. In W. Epstein (Ed.), Stability and constancy in visual perception (pp. 321–373). Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  91. Roden, D. (2010). Sonic art and the nature of sonic events. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(1), 141–156. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0002-7.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  92. Russell, B. (1912). The problems of philosophy. Oxford University Press (OUP).

    Google Scholar 

  93. Schellenberg, S. (2018). The unity of perception: content, consciousness. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  94. Schellenberg, S. (2019). Accuracy conditions, functions, perceptual discrimination. Analysis, 79(4), 739–754. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz057

    Article  Google Scholar 

  95. Schwitzgebel, E. (2008). The unreliability of naive introspection. The Philosophical Review, 117(2), 245–273. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-037

    Article  Google Scholar 

  96. Schwitzgebel, E. (2012). Introspection, what? Introspection and Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0001

    Article  Google Scholar 

  97. Shockley, K., Carello, C., & Turvey, M. T. (2004). Metamers in the haptic perception of heaviness and moveableness. Perception & Psychophysics, 66(5), 731–742.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  98. Siedenburg, K., & McAdams, S. (2017). Four distinctions for the auditory “wastebasket” of timbre1. In Frontiers in Psychology (Vol. 8). Frontiers Media S.A. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01747.

  99. Smith, A. D. (2002). The problem of perception. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  100. Stilp, C. E., Alexander, J. M., Kiefte, M., & Kluender, K. R. (2010). Auditory color constancy: calibration to reliable spectral properties across nonspeech context and targets. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 72(2), 470–480.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  101. Strang, A. J., Haworth, J., Hieronymus, M., Walsh, M., & Smart, L. J. (2011). Structural changes in postural sway lend insight into effects of balance training, vision, and support surface on postural control in a healthy population. European Journal of Applied Physiology, 111(7), 1485–1495. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00421-010-1770-6.

  102. Titchener, E. B. (1899). Structural and functional psychology. Philosophical Review, VIII, 290–299. https://doi.org/10.2307/2176244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  103. Turvey, M. T. (2019). Lectures on perception: An ecological perspective.

  104. Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color, and content (vol. 113). MIT Press.

  105. von Helmholtz, H. (1867). Handbuch der physiologischen Optik. Leopold Voss.

    Google Scholar 

  106. Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. Holt.

    Google Scholar 

  107. Zahorik, P., & Wightman, F. L. (2001). Loudness constancy with varying sound source distance. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 78–83. https://doi.org/10.1038/82931

    Article  Google Scholar 

  108. Zaidi, Q. (1998). Identification of illuminant and object colors: heuristic-based algorithms. J. Opt. Soc. Am. A, 15, 1767–1776.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  109. Zaidi, Q. (2002). Color constancy in a rough world. Color Research & Application, 26(S1), S192–S200.

Download references

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alessandra Buccella.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Buccella, A. The problem of perceptual invariance. Synthese (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03402-2

Download citation

Keywords

  • Perception
  • Invariance
  • Perceptual constancy
  • Properties
  • Relations