Abstract
A recent flurry of philosophical research on microaggression suggests that there are various practical and moral reasons why microaggression may be objectionable, including that it can be offensive, cause epistemic harms, express demeaning messages about certain members of our society, and help to reproduce an oppressive social order. Yet little attention has been given to the question of whether microaggression is also epistemically objectionable. This paper aims to further our understanding of microaggression by appealing to recent work on moral encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the moral stakes of believing—to argue that microaggression can be irrational in a distinctively epistemic sense, as it can involve relying on an epistemically unwarranted belief. This view suggests that the notion of epistemic justification may come apart from the notion of epistemic blame.
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Notes
Note that there are other ways to conceive of the moral encroachment thesis. On some views, “the type of evidence provided by statistical generalizations (or specifically demographic generalizations)” is problematic (Bolinger, 2018). See, e.g., Armour (1994), Moss (2018). On other views, “the moral reasons against belief undermine the epistemic permission otherwise afforded by [one’s] evidence” (Bolinger, 2018). See, e.g., Basu and Schroeder (2019), Basu (2019a, 2019b), Fritz (2017).
Note that my analysis might exclude microaggressions that do not have an epistemic component—in particular, what are sometimes called ‘environmental microaggressions’: that is, “racial assaults, insults and invalidations which are manifested on systemic and environmental levels” (Sue et al., 2007, p. 278). An example might be being the only person of color in veterinary school. Moreover, my analysis might also exclude some (nonverbal) microaggressions that are based on an implicit bias: for example, a case in which a white woman clutches her purse at the sight of a Black man approaching without forming a belief regarding the criminality of the man. An analysis of whether such a case has an epistemic component is well beyond the scope of this paper, but it’s worth noting that whether or not it does may depend on whether implicit bias arises from unconscious associative structures or processes (see, e.g., Brownstein and Madva, 2012; Madva, 2016; Toribio, 2018) or from unconscious propositional beliefs or belief-like states (see, e.g., De Houwer, 2014; Mandelbaum, 2016).
This example is adapted from a case I introduce in Perez Gomez (2020).
Attributional ambiguity is taken to be harmful both because it prevents victims from acting on what they suspect is the case (Fatima, 2017; Friedlaender, 2018; Sue et al., 2007), and because it can cause a microaggression victim to experience undue self-doubt about what she knows is the case (Fatima, 2017).
See also Perez Gomez (2020).
Note that the classic motivating example for moral encroachment considers a story in which a woman orders John Hope Franklin, one of the few African American members of the exclusive Cosmos Club, to bring her her coat (Gendler, 2011). Note, also, that although I will not in this paper use this example as a case of microaggression, this kind of case is generally taken to be a standard example of a microaggression. See, e.g., Sue et al. (2007), who maintain that mistaking a person of color for a service worker expresses the following message “People of color are servants to Whites. They couldn’t possibly occupy high-status positions” (Sue et al., 2007, p. 276). Of course, one need not think that such an action always expresses this specific message. As I argue in Perez Gomez (2020), the content of the message that is expressed by such an action may depend on the intention of the speaker, the understanding of the interpreter, and the context in which the action occurs.
For example, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, Blacks and Hispanics fare worse than whites and Asians, and people with disabilities fare worse than people without disabilities, across all of the work force characteristics examined by the report: educational attainment, occupation, earnings, and employment status (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2017. “Labor force characteristics by race and ethnicity, 2016.” Report 1070. https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2016/home.htm). Similar disparities exist in other spheres of life: for example, in terms of life expectancy and other key health outcomes. See: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2013. “CDC Health Disparities and Inequalities Report—United States, 2013.” https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf.
The American Philosophical Association. “Demographic Statistics on the APA Membership, FY2016 to FY2018i.” https://www.apaonline.org/page/demographics. Of course, Hispanics/Latinx are not the only group that is underrepresented in the profession. People who identify as women, Asian, Black, American Indian, Pacific Islander, as well as people who report having a disability are also underrepresented in the profession.
“Population estimates, July 1st, 2019.” United States Census Bureau: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219.
Given the background conditions of this case, it may well be that Harry is motivated by implicit bias. However, for the purposes of the analysis I seek to offer here, I will set this aside and focus instead on what may be going on rationally and epistemically in such a case.
Supporters of moral encroachment differ with respect to why this is epistemically impermissible. Some appeal to the upstream factors of an agent’s belief-formation process to argue that moral features can limit what it is permissible for an agent to take into account when forming her beliefs. (See, e.g., Buchak, 2014; Boligner, 2018; Moss, 2018.) Others argue that moral features—such as the content of a belief—can determine whether holding a belief is permissible. (See, e.g., Basu, 2019a, 2019b). Finally, some appeal to the idea that the downstream moral effects of one’s belief can impinge upon the rationality of relying on one’s belief (see, specifically, Fritz, 2017; see also Guerrero, 2021). This latter view is the one that interests me in this paper. Although this is a broad category of views—including, e.g., the costs of error in having a certain attitude, and the risks of error on the basis of the relevant belief—in what follows I focus only on stakes-related reasons.
This is a simplified version of this principle. For other formulations of it, see Bolinger (2020, p. 4), Fantl and McGrath (2009, p. 66), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), and Ross and Schroeder (2014). Note, however, that, as Bolinger (2020) indicates, many supporters of moral encroachment depart from this principle, replacing it with a “No conflicts” principle according to which “If an epistemic attitude is epistemically impeccable, it must be morally permissible” (2020, p. 4). Cf. Fritz (2017).
It’s important that the practical features must encroach upon believing falsely, and not upon belief itself. If they encroached upon belief itself, the thesis would entail that one ought to believe for Pascal’s Wager-type reasons—that believing in God’s existence would be prudent—thereby justifying being bribed into believing, as this would also be prudent (Worsnip, 2020), which would clearly be wrong (see also Moss, 2018). The same applies to the moral encroachment thesis I discuss below. Also, that there are other takes on how practical factors can encroach upon knowledge. See, e.g., Fantl and McGrath (2009), Moss (2018).
See also Schroeder (2012). As Schroeder writes, “When you form a belief, you take a risk of getting things wrong that you do not take by withholding. In contrast, when you withhold, you guarantee that you miss out on getting things right. So plausibly, one important source of reasons to withhold will come from the preponderance of the cost of having a false belief over the cost of missing out on having a true belief” (Schroeder 2012, p. 277).
For more on this view, see Fritz (2017).
In order to get the contrast between a low-stakes case and a high-stakes case, we must imagine drastically different background conditions. I take this to be a plausible exercise, but note that Basu has argued that this move does not work in a society such as ours, where, for example, race and racism have “formed the bedrock for society” (Basu, 2019a, p. 15).
To see this point, we need not endorse the controversial claim that the moral features of a case prohibit or require holding a certain belief—a view sometimes called radical moral encroachment. (See, e.g., Basu and Schroder, 2019; Basu, 2019a; Schroder, 2018). All we need to see is that moral features can affect whether acting on a belief is epistemically rational: e.g., by affecting the epistemic status (e.g., the justification) of an epistemic state (e.g., a belief). This is sometimes called moderate moral encroachment.
On this picture of moral encroachment, a belief is justified only if the reasons for belief are at least as good as the reasons for withholding belief. As Schroeder puts it: “It is epistemically rational for S to believe that p in c just in case, in c, S has at least as much epistemic reason to believe that p as to believe that ¬p and S has at least as much epistemic reason to believe that p as to withhold with respect to p” (Schroeder, 2012, p. 274). Thus, the epistemic reasons required to justify belief increase as a result of increasing reasons for withholding belief, which are the result of the increased moral stakes of believing p.
Just as in ‘Dinner’ above, I will set aside issues concerning implicit bias or other mechanisms that may impact Ethan’s behavior. My goal is to examine what may be going wrong epistemically if we could pause and examine Ethan’s thought process.
One might worry that there is a disanalogy between the peanut butter case and the microaggression case: in the former, the agent has access to the raised stakes (because she is deadly allergic to peanut butter), but in the latter, the agent may not have access to the raised stakes (because she may not know of the pattern of harmful slights or insults experienced by the recipient of her comment). I discuss this point in Sect. 5.
Let me clarify that the cases relevant for moral encroachment are cases in which the moral problem bears “an obvious connection to the epistemic justification of a belief” (Fritz, 2017, p. 10). Suppose you are jealous of your new colleague because you believe that she was offered the job simply because she is Black, which makes you wish you could denigrate her. One day, you say to her “Wow, you are so articulate,” successfully microaggressing her—say, by communicating a demeaning message about Blacks in general and about her in particular. In this case, even if you attempted to denigrate her on much stronger or much weaker evidence that she got the job because she is Black, “you would still be engaged in an evil project” (Fritz, 2017, p. 10). The problem here is not an epistemic problem; it is strictly a moral one.
See, e.g., Sue et al. (2007, pp. 276–77).
Of course, if the American came to believe that English is a second language for the Asian-American without the strong evidence supposed in this case, the harm that he causes if he acts on this belief and it is false may well give him reason to withhold belief.
Internalists about reasons would presumably say that an agent who is ignorant of the high stakes believes justifiably, but externalists can say that in order to determine when such an agent is in a position to know, and thereby to rationally rely on her beliefs, we must account for factors that are external to his internal state. Settling this debate is well beyond the scope of this paper, however (see Finlay and Schroeder, 2017). For a defense of the externalist position, albeit with regard to knowledge and in the context of decision theory, see Kim (2019). See also Baril (2019), Coss (2019). Cf. Schroeder (2012), who argues that when an agent is ignorant of the stakes, she fails to know the relevant proposition but may nonetheless believe justifiably.
Contrast this with a case in which Ethan is culpably ignorant of the stakes. Suppose, for instance, that although Ethan has average cognitive capacities and lives in a society in which it is well-known that certain people are regularly subject to certain subtle but harmful slights or insults, Ethan is negligent in recognizing this fact. This, in turn, means that he is ignorant, too, that when he acts on his belief that f and it is false, he commits a morally objectionable microaggression. In this case, Ethan is not simply ignorant of the high stakes; he is culpably ignorant of them. He lacks the appropriate sensitivity to the moral features of the situation he is in.
For a defense of the idea that epistemic blame is separate from moral or professional blame, see Brown (2020b). Consider Brown’s own example: “if a private citizen dogmatically clings to a belief, say, about the age of the earth, even after receiving evidence which undermines her belief, it is much less obvious that she is blameworthy in a moral or professional sense. For it is not obvious she has any moral or professional duty to conform her belief about the age of the earth to the evidence” (Brown, 2020a, 2020b, p. 3596).
These tools range from forming support networks with faculty from other department (Sue and Spanierman, 2020), to representing diverse perspectives in course materials (Burns, 2014), to using one’s own anxiety as a pedagogical tool (Sue & Spanierman, 2020) and practicing critical humility (Burns, 2014), to many others.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Julius Schönherr and Aiden Woodcock for fruitful conversation on these topics and for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Francisca Perez, the audience at the Fall 2020 Philosophy Seminar Series at Marquette University, and to three anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments, questions, and suggestions.
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Perez Gomez, J. Moral encroachment and the epistemic impermissibility of (some) microaggressions. Synthese 199, 9237–9256 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03201-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03201-9