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The affective and normative intentionality of skilled performance: a radical embodied approach

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Abstract

In this paper, we argue that the intentionality at play in skilled performance is not only inherently normative but also inherently affective. We take a radically embodied approach to the mind in which we conceive of cognitive agents as sensorimotor systems moved to maintain their biological and sociocultural identity, whose perception is direct and occurs in terms of affordances. Within this framework, we define skilled performance as the enactment of action and perception patterns in which the agent is intentionally oriented towards specific features in the environment. We propose that (i) skillful intentionality is guided by normative constraints involving the material and social conditions of the agent but is ultimately determined by the intrinsic purpose of maintaining the agent’s identity, and (ii) skilled intentionality is inherently affective because it is a specific occurrence arising from a general sense of care to maintain one’s identity which is realized by orienting oneself towards the right aspects of the environment in the right way. Skilled performance thus requires agents to establish a normative and affective intentionality towards aspects of their material environment. We show that, since sociocultural practices shape human identities, sociocultural practices play a crucial role in shaping human intentionality of skilled performance both in their normative and affective dimensions. Maintaining a human identity, we argue, amounts to routinely carrying out activities that form a historical pattern which is shared with and recognized by others.

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Notes

  1. This applies not only to humans, but to any form of life whose patterns of interaction are relatively uncoupled from the metabolic needs of the organism.

  2. It seems that not all sensorimotor schemes need to be frequently enacted in order to be maintained. For example, schemes that support activities that once were frequently enacted, such as riding a bicycle or dancing, might not disappear after years of not enacting them (Di Paolo et al., 2017). The variation between schemes in regard their durability through time is an open question.

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Acknowledgements

Laura Mojica acknowledges support by the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST) and by a scholarship granted by the Mexican Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACyT). Melina Gastelum acknowledges support by the Mexican Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACyT) and to the support of the PAPIIT IN 402018 “Cognición, artefactualidad y representación en la ciencia,” directed by Dr. Sergio Martínez at UNAM. Both authors thank Katsunori Miyahara and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Embodied Cognitive Science Unit (ECSU), Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST), Onna, Japan

    Laura Mojica

  2. Social Sciences and Humanities Division, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Cuajimalpa (UAM-C), Mexico City, Mexico

    Laura Mojica

  3. Faculty of Philosophy and Literature (FFYL), National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City, Mexico

    Melina Gastelum Vargas

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  1. Laura Mojica
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  2. Melina Gastelum Vargas
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Correspondence to Melina Gastelum Vargas.

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This article belongs to the topical collection on Minds in Skilled Performance, edited by Katsunori Miyahara, Ian Robertson and Michael Kirchhoff.

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Mojica, L., Gastelum Vargas, M. The affective and normative intentionality of skilled performance: a radical embodied approach. Synthese 199, 8205–8230 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03159-8

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