Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Justification by acquaintance

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

While there is no shortage of philosophical literature discussing knowledge by acquaintance, there is a surprising dearth of work about theories of epistemic justification based on direct acquaintance. This paper explores a basic framework for a thoroughly general account of epistemic justification by acquaintance. I argue that this approach to epistemic justification satisfies two importance aspects (objective and subjective) of justification. After sketching how the acquaintance approach can meet both objective and subjective aspects for epistemic justification, I will outline how this general account of justification by acquaintance can be applied to the analysis of justification for many types of beliefs (e.g., non-inferential, inferential, a priori, empirical justification, etc.). Finally, some of the objections to the acquaintance approach will be considered and answered.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The standard way of understanding these different types of knowledge are available in many resources. One good example of this is Stephen Hetherington, “Knowledge,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d., sec. 1, https://www.iep.utm.edu/knowledg/.

  2. Some notable exceptions include Richard A. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995); Brie Gertler, Self-Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 2010); Brie Gertler, “Renewed Acquaintance,” in Introspection and Consciousness, ed. Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 93–127. While I am undoubtedly indebted to the pioneering work of these (and others) who have worked on acquaintance and justification, there are still ways in which my theory is aiming to provide a more general theory of justification, rather than defending merely one species of epistemic justification or knowledge.

  3. See Stewart Cohen, “Justification and Truth,” Philosophical Studies 46, no. 3 (1984), pp. 279–95.

  4. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, 97.

  5. Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 3d. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 281–282; Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 7–8; Roderick M. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 4; Cohen, “Justification and Truth”; Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 242–258; Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen, “Justification, Truth, and Coherence,” Synthese 55, no. 2 (1983), pp. 191–207; Timothy J. McGrew and Lydia McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 35–53; Paul K. Moser, Empirical Justification (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 5–8.

  6. A “magic” eight ball is toy that gives answers to yes/no questions randomly. Among its obvious defects for being a source of justified belief is that its responses lack an objective connection to truth.

  7. This brief digression about epistemic probability is due to the helpful prompt from Reviewer #3 of this journal.

  8. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 41.

  9. Even in his radical externalism that stipulates epistemic justification requires nothing more than a certain type of true belief, Clayton Littlejohn agrees that a clairvoyant’s high reliability is not sufficient for justification. See Clayton Littlejohn, Justification and the Truth-Connection (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 28–29.

  10. The “new evil demon” was introduced as a problem for externalist views of justification by Lehrer and Cohen, “Justification, Truth, and Coherence”; Cohen, “Justification and Truth.”

  11. Reviewer #3 raises an interesting question about the scope of my locution “purview of awareness,” and whether it is a modal notion (e.g., causally possible, conceptually possible, etc.) in particular. While I don’t have a definite answer to this query (I admit that there are still questions to be resolved about my own views), I’m sympathetic to the idea that for p to be within a person’s purview of awareness means that a person is in a position to be aware of p. How exactly to cash out this notion with some difficult and contrived cases is not clear to me. If this proves to be a difficulty in accepting my general account of justification, it will have to be taken up and answered at another time in another paper.

  12. See Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Michael Huemer, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 1 (2007), pp. 30–55.

  13. This objection to phenomenal conservatism is developed in section 3.2 of John M. DePoe, “Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism,” Philosophical Studies 152, no. 3 (2011), pp. 347–59. In fairness, inquisitive readers should be aware that Michael Huemer has published a response, which they can read to determine which side they find more persuasive. Michael Huemer, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe,” Philosophical Studies 156, no. 1 (2011), pp. 1–13.

  14. See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

  15. For an example of a view that unnaturally satisfies these two criteria by combining phenomenal conservatism and proper functionalism, see Michael Bergmann, “Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings,” Philosophical Studies 166, no. 1 (2013), pp. 163–184.

  16. Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1910, p. 108).

  17. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, ed. John Perry, reprint ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 46).

  18. Gertler, “Renewed Acquaintance”.

  19. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, 77.

  20. Reviewer #3 raised this objection.

  21. Reviewer #3 is concerned about potential confusion that may come from my description of direct acquaintance being cognitive, while denying it has epistemic standing on its own. All that I mean by it being a cognitive relation is that it is a certain type of dyadic relation between a mind and an object of thought. Minimally, then, my view is that direct acquaintance is cognitive (relating to the mind), while not necessarily being epistemic (having to do with propositional belief). For reasons related to keeping this paper at a manageable size, I cannot get into my views about knowledge by acquaintance as distinct from propositional knowledge.

  22. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, reprint ed. (New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 151).

  23. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, pp. 73–79.

  24. My slightly looser way of phrasing this sentence was tightened up due to Reviewer #3’s comments.

  25. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, 75.

  26. The notion of a truth-bearing relationship invites many questions that cannot be answered in the space constraints of this paper. Reviewer #3 raises some good ones about my stretching this concept in a way to make possible being acquainted with the relation of providing-the-best-explanation. The reviewer’s preference is for phrasing such as “truth-connected relationship” or “making-likely relationship,” both of which are fine with me. Clearly, this is a place where more work can be done, which (when completed) will provide more insight into the limits of justification by acquaintance.

  27. The idea that phenomenal conservatism may fall into the vice of conceptual circularity was first introduced to me by Richard A. Fumerton, “Epistemic Conservatism: Theft or Honest Toil,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, ed. Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 64–87.

  28. Of course, these accounts may not be intending to provide a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification. Fine. Score another virtue for justification by acquaintance since it also provides a conceptual analysis of justification where others cannot.

  29. One example of justification by acquaintance for non-inferential empirical justification of this sort is Evan Fales, A Defense of the Given (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), pp. 173–179.

  30. Of course, since the grounds for inferential justification consists of other justified beliefs, this means that the analysis of inferential justification implicitly relies on the concept of justification. This will result in a conceptually circular account of justification if the analysis of the justified beliefs endlessly refers to other justified beliefs (i.e., when all justified beliefs are inferred from other justified beliefs). Thus, the acquaintance theorist who wishes to provide a conceptual analysis of justification should provide a recursive definition of justification where the analysis of non-inferentially justified beliefs serves as the base clause from which inferentially justified beliefs are derived. It may be the case that some acquaintance theorists may not intend for (GJA) to serve as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification. For instance, a coherentist could accept (GJA), while rejecting it as an analysis of justification (since the coherentist could not provide a non-circular conceptual account of justification on this schema). For some helpful introductory insights on this issue, see Richard A. Fumerton, Epistemology (Malden, Mass.: Wiley, 2006), pp. 41–42. Reviewer #1 from this journal pointed out that a similar type of recursive definition of inferential justification can be found in Timothy J. McGrew, The Foundations of Knowledge (Lanham, MD: Littlefield Adams, 1995), chap. 3.

  31. For instance, all of the following accounts of a priori justification and knowledge appear to be consistent with the acquaintance approach: George Bealer, “A Theory of the A Priori,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999), pp. 29–55; Laurence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1998); McGrew and McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, chap. 5.

  32. Elsewhere, I have defended how justification based on direct acquaintance provides sufficient subject awareness and truth-connection. See John M. DePoe, “Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape,” Acta Analytica 27, no. 4 (2012), pp. 409–423.

  33. The origins of this problem are attributed to a criticism Gilbert Ryle raised to A. J. Ayer, according to Roderick Chisholm. See Roderick M. Chisholm, “The Problem of the Speckled Hen,” Mind 51, no. 204 (1942), pp. 368–373.

  34. Ernest Sosa, “Privileged Access,” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Aleksandar Jokic and Quentin Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 277–278).

  35. Reviewer #1 suggests that the acquaintance theorist could maintain that one is justified in believing that there is an image of about fifty speckles. I’m sympathetic to this approach, and something like it is also defended (as one of many solutions) in Richard A. Fumerton, “Speckled Hens and Objects of Acquaintance,” Philosophical Perspectives 19, no. 1 (2005), pp. 121–138.

  36. Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

  37. Some of these responses can be found in Earl Conee, “The Comforts of Home,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70, no. 2 (2005), pp. 444–451; Richard A. Fumerton, “Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home,” Philosophical Studies 142, no. 1 (2009), pp. 67–76; John Hawthorne, “Knowledge and Evidence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70, no. 2 (2005), pp. 452–458; McGrew and McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, chap. 5. For a lengthier account of my response to Williamson’s argument see John M. DePoe, “Williamson on the Evidence for Skepticism,” Southwest Philosophical Studies 30 (2008), pp. 23–32.

  38. Reviewer #1 notes that this response seems to underplay the significance of Williamson’s argument. After all, sensory experiences are the basis for a lot of our beliefs! True. However, in conjunction with the other responses that I raise below, the most that the objection from vagueness can show is that those rare borderline cases remain unjustified. The rejection of Williamson’s safety requirement in particular prevents his argument from generalizing.

  39. Both Reviewer #1 and Reviewer #3 pointed out a clumsy way that this was stated in an earlier draft, which I have attempted to express more clearly in this form.

  40. Fumerton, “Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home”, 73.

  41. This point is made by McGrew and McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, 119.

  42. McGrew, The Foundations of Knowledge, pp. 89–90.

  43. McGrew and McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, 124. On the prior page, the McGrews disavow that their views involve any foundational knowledge that involves comparisons and contrasts between referentially formed beliefs insofar as they involve the application of mind-independent standards for defining concepts that lie on a continuum. However, they continue to offer some examples similar to the one used in this paragraph (along with subjectively self-dubbed meanings for the application of these concepts) to motivate the ways that these beliefs can have more interesting content.

  44. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, 218.

  45. I have adopted Reviewer #1’s advice to spell out the extreme nature of this form of skepticism, which was not present in an earlier draft.

  46. Some might wonder if the very fact that there is a question about what relations we are directly acquainted with is somehow an argument against justification by acquaintance. Without a developed argument on this point, I would presume that such an objection is confusing a number of important issues. For instance, it may be assuming that being directly acquainted with some relation is sufficient for knowing that it exists—a claim that I have repeatedly rejected in this account of (GJA). Or, perhaps, it might assume that one must know (or justifiably believe in) certain inferential forms to make use of them, which confuses the object-level and meta-level concepts of epistemology. For more on how to sort out the object-level and meta-level beliefs, see McGrew and McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, pp. 57–58. For a plausible account of how justification by acquaintance may square with the way folks ordinarily practice epistemology, see John M. DePoe, “Indirect Realism with a Human Face,” Ratio 31, no. 1 (2018), pp. 57–72.

  47. These approaches are summarized in Lorenz Demey and Joshua Sack, “Logic and Probability,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/logic-probability/.

  48. Perhaps a better way to put this is to say that Fumerton appears to be in the grips of his own theory in such a way that he is committed to ignoring or denying any awareness of relations of partial entailment. It should go without saying (even based on this paper alone) that I hold him in high regard as a philosopher and epistemologist and that I am not intending any ad hominem attack.

  49. This argument was suggested to me by Reviewer #1.

  50. Fumerton has maintained in writing that the inclination to make probabilistic judgments is ultimately an illusion with no rational or justified basis. Perhaps he would stick to this position with regard to the cases given in these two paragraphs. For further details, see Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, pp. 218–221.

  51. Of course, the work remains to provide a satisfying argument against skepticism on probabilistic grounds. The following responses to skepticism (not an exhaustive list) are among those that are available to the acquaintance theorist: Laurence BonJour, “A Version of Internalist Strong Foundationalism,” in Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, ed. Ernest Sosa and Laurence BonJour (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), chap. 5; McGrew, The Foundations of Knowledge, chap. 7; Lydia McGrew, “The World, the Deceiver, and The Face in the Frost,” Quaestiones Disputatae 8, no. 2 (2018), pp. 112–46; Moser, Empirical Justification, pp. 198–205; Jonathan Vogel, “The Refutation of Skepticism,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. Mattias Steup, Ernest Sosa, and John Turri, 3d. ed. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), pp. 108–119.

  52. I am grateful for those who read the paper and provided feedback that improved it considerably, including Travis Dickinson, Kyle Keltz, and the two anonymous reviewers for this journal.

References

  • Audi, R. (2010). Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge. (3rd ed.). Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bealer, G. (1999). A theory of the a priori. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 29–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, M. (2013). Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings. Philosophical Studies, 166(1), 163–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. . Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (1998). In defense of pure reason: A rationalist account of a priori justification. . Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (2003). A version of internalist strong foundationalism. In E. Sosa & L. BonJour (Eds.), Epistemic justification: Internalism vs. externalism, foundations vs. virtues. (pp. 3–96). Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R. M. (1942). The problem of the speckled hen. Mind, 51(204), 368–373.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R. M. (1982). The foundations of knowing. . University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, S. (1984). Justification and truth. Philosophical Studies, 46(3), 279–295.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conee, E. (2005). The comforts of home. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(2), 444–451.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology. . Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Demey, L. & Sack, J. (2019). Logic and probability. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/logic-probability/.

  • DePoe, J. M. (2008). Williamson on the evidence for skepticism. Southwest Philosophical Studies, 30, 23–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • DePoe, J. M. (2011). Defeating the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism. Philosophical Studies, 152(3), 347–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DePoe, J. M. (2012). Bergmann’s dilemma and internalism’s escape. Acta Analytica, 27(4), 409–423.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DePoe, J. M. (2018). Indirect realism with a human face. Ratio, 31(1), 57–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fales, E. (1996). A defense of the given. . Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fumerton, R. A. (1995). Metaepistemology and skepticism. . Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fumerton, R. A. (2005). Speckled hens and objects of acquaintance. Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1), 121–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fumerton, R. A. (2007). Epistemic conservatism: Theft or honest toil. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. (Vol. 2, pp. 64–87). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fumerton, R. A. (2009). Luminous enough for a cognitive home. Philosophical Studies, 142(1), 67–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fumerton, R. A. (2006). Epistemology. . Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gertler, B. (2010). Self-knowledge. . Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gertler, B. (2012). Renewed acquaintance. In D. Smithies & D. Stoljar (Eds.), Introspection and consciousness. (pp. 93–127). Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hawthorne, J. (2005). Knowledge and evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(2), 452–458.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hetherington, S. (n.d.). Knowledge. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/knowledg/.

  • Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. . Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huemer, M. (2007). Compassionate phenomenal conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1), 30–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huemer, M. (2011). Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat: A reply to DePoe. Philosophical Studies, 156(1), 1–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer, K., & Cohen, S. (1983). Justification, truth, and coherence. Synthese, 55(2), 191–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Littlejohn, C. (2012). Justification and the truth-connection. . Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • McGrew, T. J. (1995). The foundations of knowledge. . Littlefield Adams.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGrew, L. (2018). The world, the deceiver, and the face in the frost. Quaestiones Disputatae, 8(2), 112–146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGrew, T. J., & McGrew, L. (2007). Internalism and epistemology: The architecture of reason. . Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Moser, P. K. (1985). Empirical justification. . D. Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. . Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11, 108–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1993). Our knowledge of the external world. (Reprint). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1997). The problems of philosophy (J. Perry, Ed.). Reprint ed. Oxford University Press.

  • Sosa, E. (2003). Privileged access. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (Eds.), Consciousness: New philosophical perspectives. (pp. 273–292). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel, J. (2014). The refutation of skepticism. In M. Steup, E. Sosa, & J. Turri (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology. (3rd ed., pp. 108–119). Wiley-Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. . Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kingdom Preparatory Academy, P.O. Box 64028, Lubbock, TX, 79464, USA

    John M. DePoe

Authors
  1. John M. DePoe
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John M. DePoe.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

DePoe, J.M. Justification by acquaintance. Synthese 199, 7555–7573 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03128-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03128-1

Keywords

Search

Navigation