Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

I could do that in my sleep: skilled performance in dreams

Synthese volume 199, pages 6495–6522 (2021)Cite this article

Abstract

The experience of skilled action occurs in dreams if we take dream reports at face value. However, what these reports indicate requires nuanced analysis. It is uncertain what it means to perform any action in a dream whatsoever. If skilled actions do occur in dreams, this has important implications for both theory of action and theory of dreaming. Here, it is argued that since some dreams generate a convincing, hallucinated world where we have virtual bodies that interact with virtual objects, there is a sense in which we can perform virtual actions. Further, we can also perform skilfully, although not all apparent skilful performance is as it seems. Since the dream world is generated by the dreamer’s own mind, it can be difficult to determine whether the dream world simply allows goals to be achieved without the abilities that would be required in a similar waking scenario. Because of this, individual dream reports alone are insufficient to determine what skills are demonstrated in a particular dream. However, taken with evidence from REM sleep behaviour disorder, incompetent dreams, lucid dreams and motor-skill practise, it is likely that skilled virtual dream performance at times involves both opportunity for virtual behaviour and the display of competence. Evidence from cognitive science suggests that dreamers can also lose competence through forgetting and other cognitive incapacities but, more surprisingly, it is possible to gain abilities in a robust sense, consistent with the idea that some dreams, at least, are virtual realities rather than imagination.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Access options

Buy single article

Instant access to the full article PDF.

USD 39.95

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. These claims are independent of each other, i.e. one could perform poorly in dreams due to having lost one’s expert skills-related knowledge or alternatively, maintain knowledge but lack a place to carry out actions. However, to say one has performed an action skilfully, both conditions must hold.

  2. For a description of the pluralistic model of dreaming, see Rosen (2018b).

  3. Some dreams might simply involve a sense of presence or minimal phenomenal selfhood (Metzinger 2013), which wouldn’t require these cognitive abilities.

  4. For a concrete example, imagine an English-only speaker offers a Chinese-only speaker a coffee. The Chinese speaker replies, out of politeness, ‘xie xie’ (thank you), which, to the English speaker, sounds like ‘sure, sure’. The English speaker gets the false impression that the Chinese speaker understood and responded in English.

  5. It may appear that skilled performance in dreams supports an anti-intellectualist stance of knowing how since, in many dreams, we lack access to propositional knowledge or memory but can still perform expertly, suggesting only procedural memories are required for some skilled performance. However, this argument will not be convincing to an intellectualist who has already rejected other evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience. The dream argument is similar to the argument that animals have procedural knowledge but not propositional knowledge (Glick 2011). So, although dreams are consistent with an anti-intellectualist stance, they don’t provide strong, novel evidence for anti-intellectualism.

  6. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 60 words, kb_dj_2013:kb [2013–09-19] sleepanddreamdatabase.org.

  7. According to Dienes and Perner (2002), regarding the implicit/explicit distinction “any environmental feature or state of affairs that is not explicitly represented but forms part of the representational content is represented implicitly” (p 6). Implicit metacognitive monitoring occurs below the level of awareness.

  8. Certain types of expertise may require more attention than others. For example, improvisation when playing an instrument may require greater attention than rehearsing a learned piece (Harris et al. 2017). Similarly, strategy sports may require greater attention than routinised sports. This may play a role in what we would expect from dream performance and the relevant cognitive mechanisms. Routinised skilled performance would be more likely to be maintained than expert improvisation despite the dreamer lacking attentive faculties.

  9. Hall/VdC Norms: Male: #0172 Sleepanddreamsdatabase.org.

  10. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 94 words, hvdc_f4 [Answer Date Unknown]. Sleepanddreamdatapase.org.

  11. One might allow that competence can be gained instantaneously and not via repetition and practice by, say, direct neural implant of ability memories. This is part of the plot of the sci-fi film The Matrix and its sequels. However, if an implanted ability, such as Kung Fu skill, was demonstrated once and then immediately lost or forgotten, we might reject the conclusion that competence was gained.

  12. Although significantly less so than physical performance, according to Gentili and colleagues (2006).

References

  • Allard, F., & Burnett, N. (1985). Skill in sport. Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie, 39(2), 294.

    Google Scholar 

  • Antelmi, E., Pizza, F., Franceschini, C., Ferri, R., & Plazzi, G. (2020). REM sleep behavior disorder in narcolepsy: A secondary form or an intrinsic feature? Sleep medicine reviews, 50, 101254. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smrv.2019.101254

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arkin, A. M., Toth, M. F., Baker, J., & Hastey, J. M. (1970). The frequency of sleep talking in the laboratory among chronic sleep talkers and good dream recallers. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease.

  • Arnulf, I. (2019). RBD: a window into the dreaming process. In C. H. Schenck, B. Högl, & A. Videnovic (Eds.), Rapid-Eye-Movement Sleep Behavior Disorder (pp. 223–242). Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baird, B., Mota-Rolim, S. A., & Dresler, M. (2019). The cognitive neuroscience of lucid dreaming. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 100, 305–323.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartlett, F. (1932). Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumeister, R. F. (1984). Choking under pressure: self-consciousness and paradoxical effects of incentives on skillful performance. Journal of personality and social psychology, 46(3), 610.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beilock, S. L., Carr, T. H., MacMahon, C., & Starkes, J. L. (2002). When paying attention becomes counterproductive: impact of divided versus skill-focused attention on novice and experienced performance of sensorimotor skills. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8(1), 6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blagrove, M., & Hartnell, S. (2000). Lucid dreaming: associations with internal locus of control, need for cognition and creativity. Personality and Individual Differences, 28(1), 41–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blumberg, M. S. (2015). Developing sensorimotor systems in our sleep. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(1), 32–37.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blumberg, M. S., Coleman, C. M., Gerth, A. I., & McMurray, B. (2013). Spatiotemporal structure of REM sleep twitching reveals developmental origins of motor synergies. Current Biology, 23(21), 2100–2109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bray, N. (2014). Sleep: inducing lucid dreams. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15(7), 428–428.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buzzi, G. (2011). False awakenings in light of the dream protoconsciousness theory: a study in lucid dreamers. International Journal of Dream Research, 4(2), 110–116.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky, N. (2014). Aspects of the theory of syntax, (Vol. 11). MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cicogna, P., & Bosinelli, M. (2001). Consciousness during dreams. Consciousness and Cognition, 10(1), 26–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Carli, F., Proserpio, P., Morrone, E., Sartori, I., Ferrara, M., Gibbs, S. A., et al. (2016). Activation of the motor cortex during phasic rapid eye movement sleep. Annals of Neurology, 79(2), 326–330.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1976). Are dreams experiences? The Philosophical Review, 85(2), 151–171.

    Google Scholar 

  • Descartes, R. (1986). Meditations on first philosophy With selections from the Objections and replies (J. Cottingham, Trans.): Cambridge Cambridgeshire; New York : Cambridge University Press.

  • Desseilles, M., Dang-Vu, T. T., Sterpenich, V., & Schwartz, S. (2011). Cognitive and emotional processes during dreaming: a neuroimaging view. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 998–1008. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.005

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (2002). The metacognitive implications of the implicit-explicit distinction. Metacognition (pp. 171–189). New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Domhoff, G. W. (2003). The scientific study of dreams: neural networks, cognitive development, and content (1st ed.). American Psychological Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Domhoff, G. W. (2007). Realistic simulation and bizarreness in dream content: past findings and suggestions for future research. In: D. Barrett & P. McNamara (Eds.), The New Science of Dreaming, pp. 1--28. Praeger Publishers.

  • Dresler, M., Koch, S. P., Wehrle, R., Spoormaker, V. I., Holsboer, F., Steiger, A., et al. (2011). Dreamed movement elicits activation in the sensorimotor cortex. Current Biology, 21(21), 1833–1837.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dresler, M., Wehrle, R., Spoormaker, V. I., Koch, S. P., Holsboer, F., Steiger, A., et al. (2012). Neural correlates of dream lucidity obtained from contrasting lucid versus non-lucid REM sleep: a combined EEG/fMRI case study. Sleep, 35(7), 1017–1020.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ennen, E. (2003). Phenomenological coping skills and the striatal memory system. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2(4), 299–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • Erlacher, D., & Schredl, M. (2008a). Cardiovascular responses to dreamed physical exercise during REM lucid dreaming. Dreaming, 18(2), 112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Erlacher, D., & Schredl, M. (2008b). Do REM (lucid) dreamed and executed actions share the same neural substrate? International Journal of Dream Research, 7–14.

  • Erlacher, D., & Schredl, M. (2010). Practicing a motor task in a lucid dream enhances subsequent performance: a pilot study. The Sport Psychologist, 24(2), 157–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Erlacher, D., Stumbrys, T., & Schredl, M. (2012). Frequency of lucid dreams and lucid dream practice in German athletes. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 31(3), 237–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan, O. J. (1995). Deconstructing dreams: the spandrels of sleep. The Journal of Philosophy, 92(1), 5–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan, O. J. (2000). Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolution of the Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: a new area of cognitive–developmental inquiry. American psychologist, 34(10), 906.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. A. (1968). The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 65(20), 627–640.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foulkes, D. (1979). Home and laboratory dreams: four empirical studies and a conceptual reevaluation. Sleep, 2(2), 233–251.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foulkes, D. (1999). Children’s Dreaming and the Development of Consciousness. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fox, K., Nijeboer, S., Solomonova, E., Domhoff, G. W., & Christoff, K. (2013). Dreaming as mind wandering: evidence from functional neuroimaging and first-person content reports. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00412

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. G. (1982). The importance of what we care about. Synthese, 257–272.

  • Frankfurt, H. G. (1999). Necessity, volition, and love. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • García-Pereira, I., Vera, L., Aixendri, M. P., Portalés, C., & Casas, S. (2020). Multisensory experiences in virtual reality and augmented reality interaction paradigms. In: Smart Systems Design, Applications, and Challenges (pp. 276–298). IGI Global.

  • Gentili, R., Papaxanthis, C., & Pozzo, T. (2006). Improvement and generalization of arm motor performance through motor imagery practice. Neuroscience, 137(3), 761–772.

    Google Scholar 

  • Glick, E. (2011). Two methodologies for evaluating intellectualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(2), 398–434.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould, S. J. (1991). Exaptation: a crucial tool for an evolutionary psychology. Journal of social issues, 47(3), 43–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Green, C. E. (1968). Lucid dreams, Vol 1. Institute of Psychophysical Research.

  • Guillot, A., Di Rienzo, F., MacIntyre, T., Moran, A., & Collet, C. (2012). Imagining is not doing but involves specific motor commands: a review of experimental data related to motor inhibition. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 6, 247.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, D. J., Vine, S. J., & Wilson, M. R. (2017). Neurocognitive mechanisms of the flow state. In: M. R. Wilson, V. Walsh, & B. Parkin (Eds.), Progress in brain research, Vol. 234, pp. 221–243. Elsevier.

  • Hawley, K. (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40(1), 19–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heynick, F. (1983). Theoretical and empirical investigation into verbal aspects of the Freudian model of dream generation. Groningen

  • Heynick, F. (1985). Dream dialogue and retrogression: neurolinguistic origins of Freud’s “replay hypothesis.” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 21(4), 321–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heynick, F. (1993). Language and its disturbances in dreams: the pioneering work of Freud and Kraepelin updated. Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobson, J. A. (1988). The Dreaming Brain: Basic Books.

  • Hobson, J. A. (2002). Dreaming: An Introduction to the Science of Sleep. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobson, J. A. (2004). A model for madness? Nature, 430(6995), 21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobson, J. A. (2005). In bed with Mark Solms? What a Nightmare! A Reply to Domhoff (2005). Dreaming, 15(1), 21–29. https://doi.org/10.1037/1053-0797.15.1.21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hobson, J. A., & Friston, K. J. (2012). Waking and dreaming consciousness: Neurobiological and functional considerations. Progress in Neurobiology, 98(1), 82–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pneurobio.2012.05.003

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hobson, J. A., Hoffman, S. A., Helfand, R., & Kostner, D. (1987). Dream bizarreness and the activation-synthesis hypothesis. Human Neurobiology, 6(3), 157–164.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobson, J. A., Hong, C.C.-H., & Friston, K. J. (2014). Virtual reality and consciousness inference in dreaming. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01133

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hobson, J. A., Pace-Schott, E. F., & Stickgold, R. (2000). Dreaming and the brain: toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. Behaviour Brain Science, 23(6), 793–842; discussion 904–1121.

  • Hobson, J. A., Pace-Schott, E. F., & Stickgold, R. (2003). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. In E. F. Pace-Schott, M. Solms, M. Blagrove, & S. Harnad (Eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations (Vol. 23, pp. 793–842). Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hong, C. C. H., Harris, J. C., Pearlson, G. D., Kim, J. S., Calhoun, V. D., Fallon, J. H., et al. (2009). fMRI evidence for multisensory recruitment associated with rapid eye movements during sleep. Human Brain Mapping, 30(5), 1705–1722.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horikawa, T., & Kamitani, Y. (2017). Hierarchical neural representation of dreamed objects revealed by brain decoding with deep neural network features. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience, 11, 4.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horikawa, T., Tamaki, M., Miyawaki, Y., & Kamitani, Y. (2013). Neural decoding of visual imagery during sleep. Science, 340(6132), 639–642.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horton, C. L., & Malinowski, J. E. (2015). Autobiographical memory and hyperassociativity in the dreaming brain: implications for memory consolidation in sleep. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00874

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ichikawa, J. (2008). Skepticism and the imagination model of dreaming. Philosophical Quarterly, 58(232), 519–527.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ichikawa, J. (2009). Dreaming and imagination. Mind and Language, 24(1), 103–121.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ichikawa, J. (2016). Imagination, dreaming, and hallucination. Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination, 149–162.

  • Ichikawa, J., & Sosa, E. (2009). Dreaming, Philosophical Perspectives. In: T. Bayne, P. Wilken, & A. Cleeremans (Eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Jackson, S. A., & Marsh, H. W. (1996). Development and validation of a scale to measure optimal experience: the flow state scale. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 18(1), 17–35.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahan, T. L., & LaBerge, S. (1994). Lucid dreaming as metacognition: implications for cognitive science. Consciousness and Cognition, 3(2), 246–264. https://doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1994.1014

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahan, T. L., & LaBerge, S. (1996). Cognition and metacognition in dreaming and waking: Comparisons of first and third-person ratings. Dreaming, 6, 235–249.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahan, T. L., & LaBerge, S. P. (2011). Dreaming and waking: Similarities and differences revisited. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 494–514. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.002

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahan, T. L., & Sullivan, K. T. (2012). Assessing metacognitive skills in waking and sleep: A psychometric analysis of the Metacognitive, Affective, Cognitive Experience (MACE) questionnaire. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 340–352. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.11.005

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kratzer, A. (1977). What ‘must’and ‘can’must and can mean. Linguistics and philosophy, 1(3), 337–355.

    Google Scholar 

  • LaBerge, S. (1981). Lucid dreaming: Directing the action as it happens. Psychology Today, 15(1), 48–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • LaBerge, S. (1993). Lucidity research, past and future. Nightlight, 5, 329–335.

    Google Scholar 

  • LaBerge, S. (2000). Lucid dreaming: Evidence and methodology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(6), 962–964.

    Google Scholar 

  • LaBerge, S., & DeGracia, D. J. (2000). Varieties of lucid dreaming experience. Individual Differences in Conscious Experience, 20, 269.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levitan, L. (1994). A fool’s guide to lucid dreaming. Nightlight, 6(2), 1–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre, T. E., Igou, E. R., Campbell, M. J., Moran, A. P., & Matthews, J. (2014). Metacognition and action: a new pathway to understanding social and cognitive aspects of expertise in sport. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01155

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mahowald, M. W., Schenck, C. H., & Bornemann, M. A. C. (2005). Sleep-related violence. Current Neurology and Neuroscience Reports, 5(2), 153–158.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maier, J. (2010). Abilities. In: E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 ed.). Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

  • Malcolm, N. (1956). Dreaming and skepticism. The Philosophical Review, 65(1), 14–37.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malcolm, N. (1959). Dreaming. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. New York: Humanities Press.

  • Mallett, R. (2020). Partial memory reinstatement while (lucid) dreaming to change the dream environment. Consciousness and Cognition, 83, 102974.

    Google Scholar 

  • Manni, R., Terzaghi, M., Ratti, P.-L., Repetto, A., Zangaglia, R., & Pacchetti, C. (2011). Hallucinations and REM sleep behaviour disorder in Parkinson’s disease: Dream imagery intrusions and other hypotheses. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1021–1026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.009

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masters, R. S. (1992). Knowledge, knerves and know-how: the role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British Journal of Psychology, 83(3), 343–358.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masters, R. S., Polman, R., & Hammond, N. (1993). ‘Reinvestment’: A dimension of personality implicated in skill breakdown under pressure. Personality and Individual Differences, 14(5), 655–666.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, T. (2003). Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2(4), 353–393.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, T. (2009). The ego tunnel: The science of the mind and the myth of the self: Basic Books (AZ).

  • Metzinger, T. (2013). Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research. Frontiers in Psychology, 4.

  • Mole, C. (2017). Attention. The {Stanford} Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/attention

  • Moses, L. J., & Baird, J. A. (1999). Metacognition. In R. A. K. Wilson, F. C. (Ed.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.

  • Mudrik, L., Faivre, N., & Koch, C. (2014). Information integration without awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(9), 488–496.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noë, A. (2005). Against intellectualism. Analysis, 65(4), 278–290.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noë, A. (2007). Magic realism and the limits of intelligibility: What makes us conscious. Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1), 457–474.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Regan, J. K., Myin, E., & Noë, A. (2005). Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness. Progress in Brain Research, 150, 55–592.

    Google Scholar 

  • Occhionero, M., Cicogna, P., Natale, V., Esposito, M. J., & Bosinelli, M. (2005). Representation of self in SWS and REM dreams. Sleep and Hypnosis, 7(2), 77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Occhionero, M., & Cicogna, P. C. (2011). Autoscopic phenomena and one’s own body representation in dreams. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1009–1015.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oudiette, D., De Cock, V. C., Lavault, S., Leu, S., Vidailhet, M., & Arnulf, I. (2009). Nonviolent elaborate behaviors may also occur in REM sleep behavior disorder. Neurology, 72(6), 551. https://doi.org/10.1212/01.wnl.0000341936.78678.3a

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Overgaard, M., & Mogensen, J. (2017). An integrative view on consciousness and introspection. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8(1), 129–141.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pace-Schott, E. F. (2005). The neurobiology of dreaming. Principles and Practice of Sleep Medicine, 5, 563–575.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paiva, T., Bugalho, P., & Bentes, C. (2011). Dreaming and cognition in patients with frontotemporal dysfunction. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1027–1035. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.06.008

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Payne, J. D. (2010). Memory consolidation, the diurnal rhythm of cortisol, and the nature of dreams: a new hypothesis. In: International review of neurobiology (Vol. 92, pp. 101–134). Elsevier.

  • Revonsuo, A. (2000). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(6), 877–901.

    Google Scholar 

  • Revonsuo, A., & Salmivalli, C. (1995). A content analysis of bizarre elements in dreams. Dreaming, 5(3), 169.

    Google Scholar 

  • Revonsuo, A., & Tarkko, K. (2002). Binding in dreams-the bizarreness of dream images and the unity of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(7), 3–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, M. G. (2013). What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00514

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, M. G. (2015). I’m thinking your thoughts while I sleep: Sense of agency and ownership over dream thought. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 2(3), 326–339. https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000064

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, M. G. (2018). Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind. Philosphical Explorations, 21(2), 295–318.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, M. G. (2018). How Bizarre? A pluralist approach to dream content. Consciousness and Cognition, 62, 148–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, M. G. (2018). Your dream-body: all an illusion? Commentary on windt’s account of the dream-body in dreaming. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(5–6), 44–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, M. G. (2019). Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep. Synthese, 1–36.

  • Rosen, M. G., & Sutton, J. (2013). Self-representation and perspectives in dreams. Philosophy Compass, 8(11), 1041–1053. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12082

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, G. (1945). Knowing how and knowing that: The presidential address. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Aristotelian society.

  • Schädlich, M., & Erlacher, D. (2018). Practicing sports in lucid dreams–characteristics, effects, and practical implications. Current Issues in Sport Science (CISS).

  • Schädlich, M., Erlacher, D., & Schredl, M. (2017). Improvement of darts performance following lucid dream practice depends on the number of distractions while rehearsing within the dream: a sleep laboratory pilot study. Journal of Sports Sciences, 35(23), 2365–2372. https://doi.org/10.1080/02640414.2016.1267387

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schenck, C. H., Bundlie, S. R., Patterson, A. L., & Mahowald, M. W. (1987). Rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder: a treatable parasomnia affecting older adults. JAMA, 257(13), 1786–1789.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schredl, M. (2010). Nightmare frequency and nightmare topics in a representative German sample. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 260(8), 565–570.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwitzgebel, E. (2008). The unreliability of naive introspection. Philosophical Review, 117(2), 245–273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shea, N., Boldt, A., Bang, D., Yeung, N., Heyes, C., & Frith, C. D. (2014). Supra-personal cognitive control and metacognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(4), 186–193.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, R. N. (2002). Preperformance state, routines, and automaticity: what does it take to realize expertise in self-paced events? Journal of sport and exercise psychology, 24(4), 359–375.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sklar, A. Y., Levy, N., Goldstein, A., Mandel, R., Maril, A., & Hassin, R. R. (2012). Reading and doing arithmetic nonconsciously. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(48), 19614–19619.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spencer, J. P., Clearfield, M., Corbetta, D., Ulrich, B., Buchanan, P., & Schöner, G. (2006). Moving toward a grand theory of development: In memory of Esther Thelen. Child Development, 77(6), 1521–1538.

    Google Scholar 

  • Squire, L. R. (2009). Memory and brain systems: 1969–2009. Journal of Neuroscience, 29(41), 12711–12716.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stumbrys, T., Erlacher, D., Schädlich, M., & Schredl, M. (2012). Induction of lucid dreams: a systematic review of evidence. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(3), 1456–1475.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stumbrys, T., Erlacher, D., & Schredl, M. (2016). Effectiveness of motor practice in lucid dreams: a comparison with physical and mental practice. Journal of Sports Sciences, 34(1), 27–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/02640414.2015.1030342

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sutton, J. (2009). The feel of the world: Exograms, habits, and the confusion of types of memory.

  • Tholey, P. (1991). Applications of lucid dreaming in sports. Lucidity Letter, 10(1/2).

  • Thomas, S., Pollak, M., & Kahan, T. L. (2015). Subjective qualities of dreams with and without awareness. Dreaming, 25(3), 173–189. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039242

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Valli, K., & Revonsuo, A. (2009). The threat simulation theory in light of recent empirical evidence: a review. The American Journal of Psychology, 17–38.

  • Valli, K., Revonsuo, A., Pälkäs, O., Ismail, K. H., Ali, K. J., & Punamäki, R.-L. (2005). The threat simulation theory of the evolutionary function of dreaming: Evidence from dreams of traumatized children. Consciousness and Cognition, 14(1), 188–218.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Eeden, F. (1913). A study of dreams. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.

  • Voss, U., & Hobson, J. A. (2014). What is the State-of-the-Art on lucid dreaming?-Recent advances and questions for future research. In: Open MIND: Open MIND. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.

  • Voss, U., Holzmann, R., Tuin, I., & Hobson, J. A. (2009). Lucid dreaming: a state of consciousness with features of both waking and non-lucid dreaming. Sleep, 32(9), 1191–1200.

    Google Scholar 

  • Voss, U., Schermelleh-Engel, K., Windt, J. M., Frenzel, C., & Hobson, J. A. (2013). Measuring consciousness in dreams: the lucidity and consciousness in dreams scale. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(1), 8–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wamsley, E. J., Hirota, Y., Tucker, M. A., Smith, M. R., & Antrobus, J. S. (2007). Circadian and ultradian influences on dreaming: A dual rhythm model. Brain Research Bulletin, 71(4), 347–354. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainresbull.2006.09.021

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wang, Y., & Morgan, W. P. (1992). The effect of imagery perspectives on the psychophysiological responses to imagined exercise. Behavioural Brain Research, 52(2), 167–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whiteley, C. M. (2020). Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming. Philosophical Studies, 1–22.

  • Windt, J. M. (2010). The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 295–316.

    Google Scholar 

  • Windt, J. M. (2013). Reporting dream experience: Why (not) to be skeptical about dream reports. Frontiers in human neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00708

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Windt, J. M. (2015). Dreaming : a conceptual framework for philosophy of mind and empirical research.

  • Windt, J. M. (2017). Predictive brains, dreaming selves, sleeping bodies: how the analysis of dream movement can inform a theory of self-and world-simulation in dreams. Synthese, 1–49.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, Lady Eaton College, Suite S118.1, Trent University, 1600 West Bank Drive, Peterborough, ON, K9L 0G2, Canada

    Melanie G. Rosen

Authors
  1. Melanie G. Rosen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Melanie G. Rosen.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Rosen, M.G. I could do that in my sleep: skilled performance in dreams. Synthese 199, 6495–6522 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03079-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03079-7

Keywords

search

Navigation