Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory

A Correction to this article was published on 06 January 2021

This article has been updated

Abstract

This paper provides evidence for a radically enactive, embodied account of remembering. By looking closely at highly context-dependent instances of memorizing and recalling dance material, I aim at shedding light on the workings of memory. Challenging the view that cognition fundamentally entails contentful mental representation, the examples I discuss attest the existence of non-representational instances of memory, accommodating episodic memory. That being so, this paper also makes room for content-involving forms of remembering. As a result, it supports the duplex vision of mentality advanced by the REC framework. Building on research on the enactive imagination, I suggest that contentless forms of remembering act below content-involving forms. In addition, contentless and contentful forms of remembering a movement are revealed as the product of culturally scaffolded engagements with others and the environment, in which direct perception and mirroring play a fundamental role. It is argued that many of the practices of remembering a movement are best explained as enactments or re-enactments of such direct ecological perceptions. In the process, the dance studio proves to be a paradigm of the extensive mind. This paper is also intended as an invitation to the REC framework to extend the family and explicitly embrace research on sociocultural practices as an equal partner, including dance studies. Given the fundamental role that sociocultural practices play in REC’s understanding of cognition, it is only natural that further radicalization goes along those lines.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Change history

  • 06 January 2021

    The original article has been corrected. A typo in the author name A. Peeters in the following reference has been corrected.

Notes

  1. 1.

    REC opposes cognitivism’s maxim that the mind represents and computes, as well as its mechanistic and neural explanations of cognition (Hutto and Myin 2017, pp. 3–4). According to REC, content is not a necessary feature of basic forms of cognition. In that context, REC argues against “any notion of content that assumes the existence of some kind of specified correctness condition” (p. 11). REC also abandons the content/vehicle distinction: “if basic minds lack content, then they lack vehicles that bear content” (p. 37), and hence denies the necessary existence of representations (understood as the vehicles of content). It is under this light that the reader ought to understand my use of the words ‘contentless’ and ‘non-representational’.

  2. 2.

    For an overview of the literature on dance and embodied cognition, see Bresnahan (2019, esp. 20–23). Despite not sharing REC’s non-representational program, Katan (2016) is an excellent example of it.

  3. 3.

    This thesis sums up the spirit of radical enactivism. For an elaborate account, see Hutto and Myin (2013).

  4. 4.

    Certain approaches that are understood by Sutton et al. (2011) as alternatives to the overreaction to intellectualist approaches are still under the influence of dualistic pictures. For instance, Behnke (1997) is held captive by the picture of the inner and the outer. Notice her tendency to talk in terms of ‘participating/experiencing from within’ and to oppose such experiences to ‘observing from the outside’. This extends to her concept of ‘ghost gesture’. Section 3.6 shows that this is also true of Kirsh (2013).

  5. 5.

    For an introduction to the varieties of enactivism, see Ward et al. (2017).

  6. 6.

    As an example, consider the 30 articles included in Frontiers in Psychology’s Topic Collection ‘Enaction and Ecological Psychology: Convergences and Complementarities’, edited by Di Paolo et al. (2020).

  7. 7.

    For instance, see Heras-Escribano et al. 2015 for the need to make sense of sense-making, or Van Dijk, Withagen and Bongers (2015)’s acknowledgment of how hard is to find, even within the most progressive ecological theories, a contentless true reading of Gibson (1979/2015) on affordances.

  8. 8.

    For an in-depth account, see Hutto and Myin (2017, pp. 203–235), Hutto and Peeters (2018).

  9. 9.

    For an in-depth account of Wittgenstein’s methodology, see McGinn (1997, pp. 9–30).

  10. 10.

    A fundamental purpose of Wittgenstein’s method is to remind us of the rhetorical character of devices such as the memory-as-a-storehouse metaphor or the inner-outer picture. Although they might come quite naturally to us, the problem arises when philosophers’ theoretical accounts forget the fact that they are mere ways of looking at things, ‘objects of comparison’ (PI 131), claiming their literalness in all possible cases.

  11. 11.

    There are exceptions. There might be specific instructions coming from the choreographer not to do so. In addition, certain dancers, for a variety of reasons, including character traits, might prefer to see the material as a whole before they start executing it. It also varies from one genre to another. In ballet, it is common that dancers only mark the movement while the instructor is executing it (see Sect. 3.6). That being so, it is highly routine that dancers start executing new dance material right away in everyday contemporary dance training.

  12. 12.

    For a contemporary discussion of the concept of affordance in the context of the ecological-enactive approach, see Heras-Escribano (2019, pp. 13–17).

  13. 13.

    Flexibility, together with mass, limb structure, size or weight have been identified as some of the most relevant physical constraints to memory task in the context of dance (Stevens 2017).

  14. 14.

    Katan (2016, esp. 67) follows Gärdenfors in using Endel Tulving’s characterization of memory, distinguishing between procedural, semantic and episodic memory. As a result, in this paragraph I have not used REC’s terminology.

  15. 15.

    However, representations do not necessarily act as intermediaries in such experiences (see my argument in Carmona 2018, p. 34). It is no coincidence that the dance metaphor used as a case study by Katan (2016) is ‘Float!’, as it is a widespread experience, of which one is likely to have autobiographical memories. Notwithstanding, one might be confronted with imagery for which one actually has no experience. For instance, one of the creative strategies of Ghent-based choreographer Lisi Estaras is to disconcert her dancers by employing imagery for which they have no autobiographical memory, such as ‘You are the last human beings on Earth’ or ‘Be edgy’. She also enjoys giving them the form of rhetorical questions. Take ‘What does your body feel like doing today?’. Furthermore, part of her creative process also draws from working with dancers who do not speak the language of instruction. Consequently, they don’t understand the imagery yet follow it by responding to fellow dancers and the environment. She gave me the example of a Korean dancer: “When he received the tasks, he couldn’t even identify the theme, but he somehow could go beyond the tasks and execute the emotion behind them” (personal communication, July 21, 2020). That being so, what is at issue here is a disagreement regarding the nature of metaphor, for instance, whether representation is of its essence. To address such a debate is beyond the scope of this article.

  16. 16.

    See Sect. 4 for an example.

  17. 17.

    For examples of metaphorical dance instructions aimed at directing mood and a close description of the context in which they emerge, see Katan (2016, pp. 87–89), even though her reading is representational in kind.

  18. 18.

    Consider Kirsh (2013)’s conception of marking as an externalization of thinking that “improves or reshapes inner processes” (p. 13), or his distinction between “external and internal simulation, between doing things internally and doing things externally” and his view of a complex coordination between the two (p. 30).

  19. 19.

    However, unlike in ballet, movement does not need to be coupled to specific musical landmarks. In fact, music and other forms of soundscapes might be used as variable factors during creation and rehearsal. In such cases, musical cues do not help recall in a significant manner, as shown in the context of the Australian Dance Theatre (Stevens et al. 2019, p. 25).

  20. 20.

    Dancers remembering together often remember less than the sum of individual memories because they tend to discard aspects of the movement that they did remember individually under the influence of someone else’s or average execution. Nevertheless, remembering together is generally effective.

References

  1. Ahlqvist, O., Ban, H., Cressie, N., & Zuniga-Shaw, N. (2010). Statistical counterpoint: Knowledge discovery of choreography information using spatio-temporal analysis and visualization. Applied Geography, 30(4), 548–560.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Baags, E., & Chemero, A. (2018). Radical embodiment in two directions. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02020-9.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Behnke, E. A. (1997). Ghost gestures: Phenomenological investigations of bodily micromovements and their intercorporeal implications. Human Studies, 20, 181–201.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Best, D. (1974). Expression in movement and the arts. London: Lepus Books.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Bläsing, B., Calvo-Merino, B., Cross, E. S., Jola, C., Honisch, J., & Stevens, C. J. (2012). Neurocognitive control in dance perception and performance. Acta Psychologica, 139(2), 300–308.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Blässing, B., Coogan, J., Biondi, J., & Schack, T. (2018). Watching or listening: How visual and verbal information contribute to learning a complex dance phrase. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1–15.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Bleeker, M. (2018). (Re)enacting thinking in movement. In M. Franco (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of dance and reenactment. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Bresnahan, A. (2014). Improvisational artistry in live dance performance as embodied and extended agency. Dance Research Journal, 46(1), 85–94.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Bresnahan, A. (2019). The philosophy of dance. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved July 31, 2020 from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/dance/.

  10. Bruineberg, J., & Rietveld, E. (2014). Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Carmona, C. (2017). More insight into the understanding of a movement. In M. A. Peters & J. Stickney (Eds.), A companion to Wittgenstein on education: Pedagogical investigations (pp. 675–686). Singapore: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Carmona, C. (2018). Dance and embodied cognition: Motivations for the enactivist program. Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 12(2), 31–43.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Carr, E., & Winkielman, P. (2014). When mirroring is both simple and “smart”. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1–7.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Corris, A. (2020). Defining the environment in organism-environment systems. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1–13.

    Google Scholar 

  15. De Laet, T. (2018). Giving sense to the past: Historical d(ist)ance and the chiasmatic interlacing of Affect and Knowledge. In M. Franco (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of dance and reenactment. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Di Paolo, E., Buhrmann, T., & Barandiaran, X. E. (2017). Sensorimotor life: An enactive proposal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Di Paolo, E., Chemero, A., Heras-Escribano M., & McGann, M. (Eds.) (2020). Topic collection ‘Enaction and Ecological Psychology: Convergences and Complementarities’. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 3176.

  18. Eleey, P. (2008). If you coulnd’t see me: The Drawings of Trisha Brown. In A. Lepecki (Ed.) (2012), Dance (pp. 184–187). London: Whitechapel Gallery and The MIT Press.

  19. Ericsson, K. A. (2003). Development of elite performance and deliberate practice. In J. L. Starkes & K. A. Ericsson (Eds.), Expert performance in sports (pp. 685–705). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Foley, M. A., Bouffard, V., Raag, T., & DiSanto-Rose, M. (1991). The effects of enactive encoding, type of movement, and imagined perspective on memory of dance. Psychological Research, 53, 251–259.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Forsythe, W. (1999). Improvisation technologies: A tool for the analytical dance eye. Karlsruhe: ZKM and Tanzarchiv.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Franco, M. (Ed.). (2018a). The Oxford handbook of dance and reenactment. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Franco, M. (2018b). Introduction: The power of recall in a post-ephemeral era. In M. Franco (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of dance and reenactment. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Gallagher, S. (2005). Dynamic models of body schematic processes. In H. De Preester & V. Knockaert (Eds.), Body image and body schema (pp. 233–250). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Gärdenfors, P. (2006). How the homo became sapiens: On the evolution of thinking. New York: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Gibson, J. J. (1979/2015). The ecological approach to visual perception. New York: Psychology Press.

  27. Graham, A. J. (2016). Space travel: Trisha Brown’s Locus. Art Journal, 75(2), 26–45.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Hanrahan, C., Tétreau, B., & Sarrazin, C. (1995). Use of imagery while performing dance movement. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 26(3), 413–430.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Hanrahan, C., & Vergeer, I. (2000–2001). Multiple uses of mental imagery by professional modern dancers. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 20(3), 231–255.

  30. Hebert, C. (2016). Movement memory: How we learn, retain and remember dance. The Dance Current, 19(6). Retrieved September 2, 2020 from https://www.thedancecurrent.com/contributor/carolyn-hebert.

  31. Heft, H. (2001). Ecological psychology in context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the legacy of William James’s radical empiricism. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Heft, H. (2020). Ecological psychology and enaction theory: Divergent groundings. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1–13.

    Google Scholar 

  33. Heras-Escribano, M. (2019). Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology: Towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02111-1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Heras-Escribano, M., Noble, J., & de Pinedo, M. (2015). Enactivism, action and normativity: A Wittgensteinian analysis. Adaptive Behavior, 23(1), 20–33.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Hutto, D. (2008). Folk psychological practices: The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. Cambridge: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Hutto, D. (2015). Overly enactive imagination? Radically re-imagining imagining. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 53(S1), 68–89.

    Google Scholar 

  37. Hutto, D. (2016). Remembering without stored contents: A philosophical reflection on memory. In S. Groes (Ed.), Memory in the twenty-first century: New critical perspectives from the arts, humanities, and sciences (pp. 229–236). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Hutto, D. (2017). REC: Revolution effected by clarification. Topoi, 36, 377–391.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Hutto, D., & Kirchhoff, M. (2014). Extensive enactivism: Why keep it all in? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1–11.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. Cambridge: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content. Cambridge: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Hutto, D., & Peeters, A. (2018). The Roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, & D. Perrin (Eds.), New directions in the philosophy of memory (pp. 97–118). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  43. Hutto, D., & Satne, G. (2015). The natural origins of content. Philosophia, 43(3), 521–536.

    Google Scholar 

  44. Jean, J., Cadopi, M., & Ille, A. (2001). How are dance sequences encoded and recalled by expert dancers? Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive, 20(5), 325–337.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Johnson, L., Sutton, J., & Tribble, E. (2014). Introduction: Re-cognising the body-mind in Shakespeare’s theatre. In L. Johnson, J. Sutton, & E. Tribble (Eds.), Embodied cognition and Shakespeare’s theatre: The early modern body-mind (pp. 1–12). New York: Taylor & Francis.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Katan, E. (2016). Embodied Philosophy in Dance: Gaga and Ohad Naharin’s movement research. London: Palgrave.

    Google Scholar 

  47. Kirsh, D. (2013). Embodied cognition and the magical future of Interaction design. ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, 20(2), 1–34.

    Google Scholar 

  48. Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E. (2018). Reconceiving representation-hungry cognition: An ecological-enactive proposal. Adaptive Behavior, 26(4), 147–163.

    Google Scholar 

  49. Loader, P. (2013). Is my memory an extended notebook? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4, 167–184.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Malcolm, N. (1986). Nothing is hidden. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  51. McGann, M. (2020). Convergently emergent: Ecological and enactive approaches to the texture of agency. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1–10.

    Google Scholar 

  52. McGinn, M. (1997). Routledge philosophy guidebook to Wittgenstein and the philosophical investigations. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Medina, J. (2013). An enactivist approach to the imagination: Embodied enactments and “fictional emotions”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 50(3), 317–335.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Merritt, M. (2015). Thinking-is-moving: Dance, agency and a radically enactive mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 14(1), 95–110.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Midgelow, V. L. (Ed.). (2019). The Oxford handbook of improvisation in dance. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Montero, B. (2016). Thought in action: Expertise and the conscious mind. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  57. Morris, T., Spittle, M., & Watt, A. P. (2005). Imagery in sport. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

    Google Scholar 

  58. Pakes, A. (2018). Re-enactment, Dance, Identity, and Historical Fiction. In M. Franco (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of dance and reenactment. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Palazzi, M., Zuniga-Shaw, N., Forsythe, W., et al. (2009). Synchronous objects for one flat thing, reproduced. In SIGGRAPH’09: ACM SIGGRAPH’09 2009 Art Gallery, Article 37, 1. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1667265.1667306.

  60. Proffitt, D. R. (2006). Embodied perception and the economy of action. Perspectives on Psychological Sciences, 1, 110–122.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Read, C., & Szokolszky, A. (2020). Ecological psychology and enactivism: Perceptually-guided actions vs. sensation-based enaction. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1–19.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Rietveld, E. (2008). The skillful body as a concernful system of possible actions. Theory & Psychology, 18, 341–363.

    Google Scholar 

  63. Rietveld, E., & Kiverstein, J. (2014). A rich landscape of affordances. Ecological Psychology, 26(4), 325–352.

    Google Scholar 

  64. Segundo-Ortin, M. (2020). Agency from a radical embodied standpoint: An ecological-enactive proposal. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1–13.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Sepúlveda-Pedro, M. (2020). Levels and norm-development: A phenomenological approach to enactive-ecological norms of action and perception. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1–15.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2009). The corporeal turn: An interdisciplinary reader. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2012). From movement to dance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 11, 39–57.

    Google Scholar 

  68. Starkes, J. L., Caicco, M., Boutilier, C., & Sevsek, B. (1990). Motor recall of experts for structured and unstructured sequences in creative modern dance. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 12, 317–321.

    Google Scholar 

  69. Stern, D. G. (1991). Models of memory: Wittgenstein and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology, 4(2), 203–218.

    Google Scholar 

  70. Stevens, C. (2017). Memory and dance: ‘Bodies of Knowledge’ in contemporary dance. In P. Hansen & B. Bläsing (Eds.), Performing the remembered present: The cognition of memory in dance, theatre and music (pp. 39–68). London: Bloomsbury.

    Google Scholar 

  71. Stevens, C., Ginsborg, J., & Lester, G. (2011). Backwards and forwards in space and time: Recalling dance movements from long-term memory. Memory Studies, 4(2), 234–250.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Stevens, C., Vincs, K., DeLahunta, S., & Old, E. (2019). Long-term memory for contemporary dance is distributive and collaborative. Acta Psychologica, 194, 17–27.

    Google Scholar 

  73. Sutton, J. (2007). Batting, habit and memory: The embodied mind and the nature of skill. Sport in Society, 1075, 763–786.

    Google Scholar 

  74. Sutton, J. (2009). Remembering. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of situated cognition (pp. 217–235). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  75. Sutton, J. (2015). Remembering as public practice: Wittgenstein, memory and distributed cogntitive ecologies. In V. A. Munz, D. Moyal-Sharrock, & A. Coliva (Eds.), Mind, language, and action: Proceedings of the 36th Wittgenstein symposium (pp. 409–443). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

  76. Sutton, J., McIlwain, D., Christensen, W., & Geeves, A. (2011). Applying intelligence to the reflexes: Embodied skills and habits between Dreyfus and Descartes. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42(1), 78–103.

    Google Scholar 

  77. Sutton, J., & Williamson, K. (2014). Embodied remembering. In L. Shapiro (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of embodied cognition. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  78. Travieso, D., Lobo, L., Paz, C., Langelaar, T., Ibáñez-Gijón, J., & Jacobs, D. M. (2020). Dynamic touch as common ground for enactivism and ecological psychology. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1–10.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Tribble, E. B. (2011). Cognition in the Globe: Attention and memory in Shakespeare’s Theatre. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  80. Van Dijk, L., Withagen, R., & Bongers, R. M. (2015). Information without content: A Gibsonian reply to Enactivist’s worries. Cognition, 134, 210–214.

    Google Scholar 

  81. Wachowicz, F., Stevens, C., & Byron, T. (2011). Effects of balance cues and experience on serial recall of human movement. Dance Research, 29(2), 450–468.

    Google Scholar 

  82. Warburton, E. C., Wilson, M., Lyinch, M., & Cuykendall, S. (2013). The cognitive effects of movement reduction: Evidence from dance marking. Psychological Science, 24(9), 1732–1739.

    Google Scholar 

  83. Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017). Introduction: The varieties of enactivism. Topoi, 36, 365–375.

    Google Scholar 

  84. Wilcox, S., & Katz, S. (1981). A direct realistic alternative to the traditional conception of memory. Behaviorism, 9(2), 227–239.

    Google Scholar 

  85. Wittgenstein, L. (1980). RPP I Remarks on the philosophy of psychology (Vol. I). Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  86. Wittgenstein, L (2009). PI Philosophical investigations (Revised 4th ed.). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Download references

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Lisi Estaras, Jerrold Levinson and Manuel de Pinedo for their fruitful comments and suggestions to an earlier version of this paper. I am also thankful to Lisi Estaras, Manuela Nogales, Vicente Sanfélix and Neftalí Villanueva for insightful conversations during the writing process. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the great comments I received from the reviewers that made me clarify my ideas and the theoretical purposes of this paper.

Funding

This paper has been produced in the context of (1) the research project Intercultural Understanding, Belonging and Value: Wittgensteinian Approaches” (PGC2018-093982-B-100) funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation & Universities, and (2) a research project granted by the Andalusian government (B-HUM-459-UGR18).

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Carla Carmona.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

The original online version of this article was revised: author name in reference Hutto, D., & Peters, A. (2018). The Roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, & D. Perrin (Eds.), New directions in the philosophy of memory (pp. 97–118). New York: Routledge was corrected from Peters to Peeters.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Carmona, C. Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory. Synthese (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02949-w

Download citation

Keywords

  • Contentless remembering
  • Dance practice
  • Memory
  • Radically enactive cognition
  • Skilled action