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Bias in science: natural and social

  • Objectivity in Social Research
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Abstract

Moral, social, political, and other “nonepistemic” values can lead to bias in science, from prioritizing certain topics over others to the rationalization of questionable research practices. Such values might seem particularly common or powerful in the social sciences, given their subject matter. However, I argue first that the well-documented phenomenon of motivated reasoning provides a useful framework for understanding when values guide scientific inquiry (in pernicious or productive ways). Second, this analysis reveals a parity thesis: values influence the social and natural sciences about equally, particularly because both are so prominently affected by desires for social credit and status, including recognition and career advancement. Ultimately, bias in natural and social science is both natural and social—that is, a part of human nature and considerably motivated by a concern for social status (and its maintenance). Whether the pervasive influence of values is inimical to the sciences is a separate question.

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Acknowledgements

Versions of this paper were presented at the Philosophy of Science Association, a Philosophy and Neuroscience Workshop organized by John Bickle and Antonella Tramacere, and the Values in Medicine, Science, & Technology Conference organized by Matt Brown. In addition to the organizers and audience members at these events, I thank the following for feedback on the manuscript: Marshall Abrams, Rajesh Kana, Kevin McCain, and Alexa Tullett. Work on this article was supported by an Academic Cross-Training Fellowship from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation.

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    Joshua May

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May, J. Bias in science: natural and social. Synthese 199, 3345–3366 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02937-0

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