Abstract
According to the non-factive hypothesis, espoused by contemporary epistemologists, our ordinary practice of evaluating belief is insensitive to the truth. In other words, on the ordinary view, there is no evaluative connection between what someone should believe and whether their belief would be true. Contrary to that, the factive hypothesis holds that our ordinary practice of evaluating belief is sensitive to the truth. Results from recent behavioral studies strongly support the factive hypothesis, but this evidence was recently subjected to three new objections (Weissglass in Synthese, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02584-5). This paper summarizes and responds to these objections.
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Acknowledgements
For helpful feedback and discussion, I thank Angelo Turri, Sarah Turri, and Daniel Weissglass. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Canada Research Chairs program.
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Turri, J. Evaluating objections to a factive norm of belief. Synthese 199, 2245–2250 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02881-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02881-z