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An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds

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Abstract

This paper defends an ontology of weak entity realism for homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theories of natural kinds, adapted from Bird’s (Synthese 195(4):1397–1426, 2018) taxonomy of such theories. Weak entity realism about HPC kinds accepts the existence of natural kinds. Weak entity realism denies two theses: that (1) HPC kinds have mind-independent essences, and that (2) HPC kinds reduce to entities, such as complex universals, posited only by metaphysical theories. Strong entity realism accepts (1) and (2), whereas moderate entity realism accepts only (1). Given its commitment to (2), strong entity realism is more theoretically complex than weak entity realism, with little explanatory payoff. Given their commitment to (1), moderate and strong entity realisms cannot explain how the identity conditions of HPC kinds are to be straightforwardly knowable. I argue that weak entity realism avoids such epistemic difficulties. I further rebut two plausible criticisms of weak entity realism, namely that weak entity realism cannot account for quantification over kinds, and that weak entity realism cannot provide identity conditions for HPC kinds which are both scientifically useful and objective. Given the theoretical costs of strong and moderate entity realism, and weak entity realism’s adequate response to its most plausible challenges, weak entity realism about HPCs is to be preferred, especially for biological and chemical kinds.

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Notes

  1. Such joint-carving is traditionally cashed out through natural similarity relations for kind members, such that entities which have certain natural similarity relations to each other belong to the same kind K (as in Lewis 1986a, b; Sider 2009, 2013).

  2. In using “entity realism,” I am not concerned with the issues about the existence of unobservable entities with which Hacking (1983) was concerned in using the same term. Whether electrons or photons exist is not my question, though insofar as my article presumes the existence of what our best theories quantify over, it would be natural for me to say that they do (Hacking 1983; Miller 2016).

  3. Such criteria are intended to avoid substantive metaphysical disputes about what counts as a metaphysical entity. (2) in particular adds an important caveat. If it could be shown that complex universals do the kind of explanatory work ruled out by (2), then complex universals would not count as metaphysical entities as I define them. But Bird (2018) does not clearly show this.

  4. For my (coarse-grained) purposes, let’s say that biological kinds are studied and classified primarily by the biological sciences (e.g. species, genes, stem cells, neurophysiological states), chemical kinds are primarily studied and classified by chemistry (e.g. small-molecule chemical compounds and elements), and physical kinds are studied and classified primarily by basic particle physics (electrons, protons, neutrons, quarks, and other subatomic particles).

  5. It is logically possible to affirm E1 and E3 while denying E2. But it would be dialectically odd to do so, for several reasons. First, if one accepts that kinds are metaphysical entities, one is already accepting a role for metaphysical theory in the definition of kinds. An acceptance of kinds as metaphysical entities is likely a more expansive commitment to the importance of metaphysics in kind definition than is acceptance of kinds’ having essences. Second, paradigm cases of metaphysical entities, such as complex universals, are entities which plausibly do have essences (Bird 2018). In any case, I cannot think of a well-motivated view which would accept that kinds are metaphysical entities while denying that kinds have essences. And so trying to accommodate such a position in a taxonomy of entity realism would add further complexity with little obvious payoff.

  6. While SER and MER may be compatible with taxonomic anti-realism (TAR), WER requires taxonomic anti-realism. WER is not compatible with taxonomic realism tout court. But unlike the various forms of entity realism, taxonomic anti-realism/realism might be reconstrued as a gradable distinction. WER (as opposed to EAR) would then fit most naturally with a moderate or weaker form of TAR. The idea would be that there is enough robust clustering of properties to explain why kinds are useful and even necessary for robust inferences and generalizations. Thus kinds exist, on the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment (see Sect. 2). But we would still not have full taxonomic realism, because: (1) there would be some acceptable variance in scientific goals and standards, even for sciences concerned with making the most rigorous and wide-ranging investigations of the world, and (2) properties would not cluster with perfect precision and simplicity, excepting (perhaps) physical kinds (Franklin-Hall 2015).

  7. A property cluster C might remain the same property cluster even given certain changes to C’s distribution of properties, provided that changes to C’s property distribution fall within a certain range of tolerance. The range of tolerance here would be fixed by scientific practice, consistent with my denial that the individuation of kinds is fully mind-independent. So I do not claim that species cannot evolve to some extent without becoming new species.

  8. It is necessary that 1 + 1=2 if I exist, but it is certainly not essential to me that 1 + 1=2 if I exist. The fact that 1 + 1=2 has nothing to do with me, whereas any x’s essential properties must reveal something non-trivial about what x is. See Fine (1994).

  9. This sort of objectivity does not imply that kinds or property clusters have essences. As I point out in Sect. 4, the essentialism rejected by WER holds that, for any property cluster kind K, it is a perfectly objective and mind-independent fact that certain properties and only these properties are to count in the definition of K. E.g. such essentialism would hold that it is a perfectly objective fact whether a species is to be correctly defined in terms of common lineage instead of genetics, or in terms of both common lineage and genetics, or in terms of some other properties. (This is the sense of essence which is invoked by Bird (2018) and has prevailed in analytic metaphysics, especially since Fine 1994). WER need not deny that there are facts about K which could answer the question: what is K? WER need only hold that the determination of which properties and types of properties are included in a correct definition of K is not completely mind-independent, and can vary to some degree based on pragmatic judgments and aims.

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Acknowledgements

The author thanks Uriah Kriegel and Steven Crowell for their insight and feedback on previous drafts, and Mark Risjord for thorough discussion of related topics.

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    Reuben Sass

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Sass, R. An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds. Synthese 198, 11861–11880 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02838-2

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