Synthese

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Background beliefs and plausibility thresholds: defending explanationist evidentialism

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Abstract

In a recent paper, Appley and Stoutenburg present two new objections to Explanationist Evidentialism (EE): the Regress Objection and the Threshold Objection. In this paper, I develop a version of EE that is independently plausible and empirically grounded, and show that it can meet Appley and Stoutenburg’s objections.

Keywords

Explanationism Evidentialism Regress objection Threshold objection Explanatory coherentism Bayesianism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of PhilosophyWuhan UniversityWuhanChina

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