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Plurivaluationism, supersententialism and the problem of the many languages

  • Rohan Sud


According to the plurivaluationist, our vague discourse doesn’t have a single meaning. Instead, it has many meanings, each of which is precise—and it is this plurality of meanings that is the source of vagueness. I believe plurivaluationist positions are underdeveloped and for this reason unpopular. This paper attempts to correct this situation by offering a particular development of plurivaluationism that I call supersententialism. The supersententialist leverages lessons from another area of research—the Problem of the Many—in service of the plurivaluationist position. The Problem reveals theoretical reasons to accept that there are many cats where we thought there was one; the supersententialist claims that we are in a similar situation with respect to languages, propositions and sentences. I argue that the parallel suggested by the supersententialist reveals unappreciated advantages and lines of defense for plurivaluationism.


Vagueness Plurivaluationism Supervaluationism Problem of the many 



Thanks to Mercedes Maria Corredor, Daniel Drucker, Jim Joyce, Jeremy Lent, Chip Sebens, Ted Sider, Eric Swanson, three anonymous referees and, especially, David Manley and Brian Weatherson for helpful conversations and comments. Thanks also to audiences at the University of Michigan, the University of San Diego, Colgate University, the 10th Annual Mark L. Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference (and my commentators Geoffrey Grossman and Yongming Han), and the 2018 Eastern APA (and my commentator Catarina Dutilh Novaes).


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBates CollegeLewistonUSA

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