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How to be an anti-reductionist

  • Mona Simion
  • Christoph KelpEmail author
S.I. : Epistemic Dependence


One popular view in recent years takes the source of testimonial entitlement to reside in the intrinsically social character of testimonial exchanges. This paper looks at two extant incarnations of this view, what we dub ‘weak’ and ‘modest’ social anti-reductionism, and questions the rationales behind their central claims. Furthermore, we put forth an alternative, strong social anti-reductionist account, and show how it does better than the competition on both theoretical and empirical grounds.


Epistemology Testimony Anti-reductionism 



We’d like to thank Sandy Goldberg, Peter Graham, John Greco, the audience of a conference on epistemic dependence at the University of Madrid and three anonymous referees for helpful comments on this paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of GlasgowGlasgowUK
  2. 2.School of English, Communication and PhilosophyCardiff UniversityCardiffUK

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