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Synthese

pp 1–15 | Cite as

Is parthood identity?

  • Claudio CalosiEmail author
S.I.: Mereology and Identity
  • 55 Downloads

Abstract

According to a well known, yet controversial metaphysical thesis, Composition is Identity. Recently, Kris McDaniel has articulated and defended a related—and arguably more controversial—thesis, one he calls Parthood is Identity (PI). Roughly the view has it that a whole is, strictly and literally, identical to each of its parts considered individually. At first sight, the view seems rather implausible. However, McDaniel’s formulation and defense are worthy of a serious discussion. In this paper I put forth such a discussion. The result is what we should have expected all along: PI is not only implausible, but arguably false.

Keywords

Mereology Identity Location Temporary Identity 

Notes

Acknowledgements

For comments on previous drafts of this paper I would like to thank Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Neeser. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for this journal for insightful criticisms that led to substantive revisions. This work has been supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, Project Numbers BSCGIo-157792, and 100012-165738.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GeneveGenevaSwitzerland

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