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The epistemological objection to modal primitivism

  • S.I.: New Directions in the Epistemology of Modality
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Abstract

Modal primitivists hold that some modal truths are primitively true. They thus seem to face a special epistemological problem: how can primitive modal truths be known? The epistemological objection has not been adequately developed in the literature. I undertake to develop the objection, and then to argue that the best formulation of the epistemological objection targets all realists about modality, rather than the primitivist alone. Furthermore, the moves available to reductionists in response to the objection are also available to primitivists. I conclude by suggesting that extant theories of the epistemology of modality are not sensitive to the question of primitivism versus reductionism.

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Notes

  1. The term “possible world” is misleading—it’s not that some worlds are possible, and some are not possible. These worlds are simply “out there”. Lewis invokes possible worlds throughout his work, but the main source for his metaphysical views on possible worlds comes from Lewis (1986). Modal realism is not the only version of realism about possible worlds or modality, nor is it the only reductionist view. It would be better if it were called something like “concretism” about possible worlds (see Menzel 2017); however, since “modal realism” is the name by which this view is widely recognized and discussed in the literature, I will stick with the term. Defenders of versions of modal realism include Bricker (1996, 2001), Divers (2002) and McDaniel (2004).

  2. See Bueno and Shalkowski (2015), however, for an argument against theoretical utility as a truth-indicative feature of modal theories.

  3. For the original formulation of the distinction, see Quine (1951).

  4. See for instance Lewis’s (1986: pp. 150–157) objections to versions of ersatzism about possible worlds.

  5. Note that this not Lewis’s own main objection to primitivism.

  6. See for instance Cameron (2010), Sidelle (1989), Sider (2012), and Thomasson (2007, 2013).

  7. For a canonical statement of this view, see Grice (1961).

  8. See Clarke-Doane (2017), Liggins (2010) and Linnebo (2006) for discussions of the Benacerraf problem in the mathematical case; see also Benacerraf (1973) for the original formulation.

  9. See Clarke-Doane (2017: pp. 17–18) for examples.

  10. Strohminger (2015) argues that we can have perceptual knowledge of modal truths, so on her view, some cases of modal knowledge meet the causal condition. But her view is the exception; most deny that we can have perceptual knowledge of modal truths.

  11. Let a modal entity be an entity of any ontological category whose existence, instantiation, etc. has implications for modal space.

  12. Modalism is defended in deRosset (2014), Forbes (1989, 1992), Peacocke (1978, 2002), and the Postcript to Prior and Fine (1977). It is also defended in the service of an account of logical consequence in Bueno and Shalkowski (2009, 2013, 2015). If we allow modalism to also encompass views on which maximal states of affairs or world properties are primitively possible, then we may also include Adams (1974, 1981), Plantinga (1974, 1976), and Stalnaker (1976, 2012).

  13. See Jubien (2009), Lycan (1988) and Wang (2013).

  14. The following works include defenses (or at least suggestions) of dispositionalism: Borghini and Williams (2008), Contessa (2010), Ellis (2001), Jacobs (2010, 2011), Molnar (2003), Mumford (2004), Pruss (2002, 2011), and Vetter (2015).

  15. Primitivists about essence include Fine (1994, 1995), Lowe (1998, 2008a, b), and Mallozzi (Forthcoming). Note that the primitivist status of essentialism is controversial. McLeod (2001) appears to accept a modal primitivist theory that invokes essence, but Bueno and Shalkowski (2009, 2013) claim to remain neutral on which is the prior notion, essence or necessity.

  16. Defenders of dispositionalism do typically endorse modal entities—namely, the dispositional properties underlying the dispositions of objects. But the dispositionalist’s views on the nature of such properties also furnishes them with a reply to the epistemological objection. Dispositionality is a causal notion. If an object x has the disposition towards some manifestation M, then x has the causal potential to interact in certain ways with other objects, as specified in M. The dispositionalist’s response to the epistemological objection is that their modal entities are not causally inert; they are in fact individuated by their causes and effects.

  17. There is, of course, disagreement about the proper relata of causal relations—this claim may require reformulation.

  18. Lycan (1979: pp. 294–295) agrees with Richards.

  19. See Lewis (1986: p. 109).

  20. See Lewis (1986: pp. 110–112). It is worth noting that in this passage, Lewis seems to assume that it is sensitivity which is at issue in the Benacerraf problem. For discussion of how this might be problematic, see section 2.4 of Clarke-Doane (2017). Further discussion of how Lewis’s view fares with the epistemological objection appears in Stalnaker (1996).

  21. For discussions of formulations of the principle of recombination, see Bricker (1996, 2001), Divers and Melia (2002), Efird and Stoneham (2008), and Nolan (1996).

  22. Bueno and Shalkowski (2015) and Peacocke (1997, 1999) have separately defended primitivist epistemologies that seem equally available to the reductionist. So Lewis’s story is not the only one available.

  23. Versions of combinatorialist principles also appear in Eddon (2007), Maudlin (2007), Saucedo (2011), Schaffer (2003, 2010), and Sider (2005).

  24. See for instance Chalmers (2002). Note that a view on which there are analytic or constitutive relations between conceivability and possibility is unavailable to the realist about modality.

  25. A prominent defender of this position is Yablo (1993).

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Acknowledgements

Many thanks to the two referees and an audience at the 2018 Pacific APA.

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    Jennifer Wang

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Wang, J. The epistemological objection to modal primitivism. Synthese 198 (Suppl 8), 1887–1898 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01954-4

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