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Logical pluralism without the normativity

  • Christopher Blake-Turner
  • Gillian RussellEmail author
S.I.: Pluralistic Perspectives on Logic


Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals.


Logical pluralism Normativity of logic Logical consequence Inference and implication Logic and reasoning Telic logical pluralism 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of North Carolina at Chapel HillChapel HillUSA

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