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Timelessness and freedom

  • Taylor W. CyrEmail author


One way that philosophers have attempted to defend free will against the threat of fatalism and against the threat from divine beliefs has been to endorse timelessness views (about propositions and God’s beliefs, respectively). In this paper, I argue that, in order to respond to general worries about fatalism and divine beliefs, timelessness views must appeal to the notion of dependence. Once they do this, however, their distinctive position as timelessness views becomes otiose, for the appeal to dependence, if it helps at all, would itself be sufficient to block worries about fatalism and divine beliefs. I conclude by discussing some implications for dialectical progress.


Dependence Divine beliefs Fatalism Propositions Timelessness 



For comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to Andrew Law, Jonah Nagashima, Michael Nelson, and Jared Smith. Thanks especially to Andrew Law and Jonah Nagashima for helpful discussion throughout the process of writing this paper.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWashington University in St. LouisSt. LouisUSA

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