Abstract
The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative.
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Notes
O’Regan (2011) disagrees with Noë on the link between action and seeing. Whereas Noë (2004, 2009b) insists that seeing (and perception more generally) is action, O’Regan merely states that seeing “[...] requires having previously acted, and it requires having the future potential for action”, but “action right now is not necessary for vision” (2011, p. 67). I express T1 in a form that fits better within Noë’s framework, however, this will not substantially affect my considerations.
It has been pointed out to me by a reviewer that in many formulations the point is not that the exercise of sensorimotor skills obeys sensorimotor laws, but that it makes use of understanding about the sensory consequences of movement given the sensorimotor laws (cfr. for example Noë 2004, pp. 77–79, 2009a, p. 478). Whether this is just equivalent to obeying sensorimotor laws is a separate issue that I leave out for another study.
Some philosophers might equate representations with computations, but the two concepts are not equivalent (for a useful discussion, see Miłkowski 2013, especially chapters 2 and 4). Following Noë and O’Regan, I will assume that thereare representations in the cognitive system; hence, I will not defend the notion of representation from the attacks of the “radically embodied” research program (e.g. Chemero 2009).
Noë admits that perceptual experience exhibits intentionality (e.g. Crane 2009), but only as a genuine relation towards objects that obtain in the world (2012, p. 25, pp. 70–73). Also, he claims that perceptual content is conceptual—a form of sensorimotor understanding—and is always propositional (Noë 2004, pp. 246–247, ft. 4). I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
It is perhaps worth emphasizing this point, since it has caused much confusion in the literature. Noë and O’Regan contend that perception should not be characterized as something that merely happens in the brain: “What perception is, however, is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole” (Noë 2004, p. 2). But this does not mean that the brain does not represent states of the environment. O’Regan clarifies his position on this issue, and specifies that he still finds useful the concept of representation, and distances himself from “enactivists” who reject representations altogether (2011, p. 62, ft. 1). Noë is perhaps more cautious on this point, since he simply claims that we should reconsider the role of representations in vision. Furthermore, although he adopts the term “enactive” (at least in his 2004, p. 2), his definition of the concept does not entail a rejection of representations (in contrast, it seems, to Varela et al. 1991).
The attack against the snapshot conception is also closely related to the controversial issue of the richness of perceptual content (cfr. Block 2007; Cohen et al. 2016; Haun et al. 2017; Phillips 2015). The snapshot conception may suggest that perceptual content is richly detailed, just like a photographic representation of a specific tract of the environment captures many of its details (cfr. Noë 2004, p. 50; O’Regan 2011, pp. 50–61).
The passage clearly mentions representations, thus supporting my interpretation regarding the presence of internal representations, i.e. at the subpersonal level (cfr. Sect. 2).
My choice to focus on Buhrmann et al.’s model is not arbitrary. Indeed, there have been other attempts to formulate the SMT in scientific terms. For example, Seth (2014) has proposed a predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies that brings the SMT closer to the orthodox approaches [cfr. Flament-Fultot (2016)]. In this sense, Seth’s work supports my thesis that the SMT should be interpreted as continuous with the orthodox approaches. By focusing on Buhrmann et al. I set out to show that even a dynamical formulation of the theory should be consistent with the orthodoxy.
A potential objection to this characterization of the Standard SMT may come from Gervais and Weber (2011), who argue contra Walmsley (2008) that dynamical covering-law explanations are not deductive, but rather causal covering law explanations using default rules. Default rules are regularities, but in contrast with laws, they admit exceptions. Alternatively, dynamical explanations may be characterized as inductive-statistical explanations using probability statements. I think that Gervais and Weber’s remarks should also be applied to the SMT, after all, most regularities in biology are not iron laws, but do frequently admit exceptions. I will not further pursue this critique, however, as it does not play a relevant role for my considerations.
An anonymous reviewer has pointed out to me that Noë’s (2004, p. 235, ft. 15) position is better interpreted as being non-committal to the existence of internal representations, whereas O’Regan seems to explicitly accept them. Indeed, it seems to me that Noë’s position is somewhat similar to Thelen et al. (2001): his version of the SMT aims at describing the overall behavior of the agent, independently from the underlying brain machinery (cfr. ft. 4).
I would like to stress that although explanations are not “just mirror images of predictions” (Douglas 2009, p. 462), this does not mean that explanations should be completely divorced from prediction. I concur with Douglas (2009) and Miłkowski (2013, pp. 104–105) about the importance of predictions, which can be used to check explanations.
In the original version, Kaplan and Craver refer to activities, rather than operations. I have adjusted the text to Bechtel’s definition of mechanism, but the variation does not alter the 3M criterion.
From this it does not follow that representations can explain all phenomena. It may well be the case that representations are still explanatory irrelevant in some contexts. There is no easy rule we can rely on in order to assess the role of representations, and each case must be examined separately.
Talk about “wide minds” is usually associated with content externalism (think of the distinction between wide and narrow mental content, Brown 2016). However, the SMT seems mostly concerned with a form of vehicle externalism. Noë uses the term “wide” in this sense (for example in his 2009b, where a whole chapter bears the title “Wide Minds”).
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Acknowledgements
This work was funded by the Barbara Wengeler Foundation and the Volkswagenstiftung’s project “Perceiving the World and Understanding other Minds” led by Tobias Schlicht. I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Thanks also to Beate Krickel, Marcin Miłkowski, and Tobias Schlicht for their support and comments on earlier versions of this paper. This work is a much extended and improved version of a paper originally published in the Proceedings of the CogSci2014, held in Québec City, Canada (Vernazzani 2014). The paper has been also presented at SOPhiA2014 in Salzburg, and ECAP9 in Munich. I thank the participants of these conferences for their comments.
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Vernazzani, A. The structure of sensorimotor explanation. Synthese 196, 4527–4553 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1664-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1664-9