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Synthese

pp 1–32 | Cite as

Dilemmic Epistemology

  • Nick HughesEmail author
Article

Abstract

This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view. Accepting this view, I argue, may enable us to solve several epistemological puzzles.

Keywords

Epistemic dilemma Truth norm Knowledge norm Epistemic rationality Action guidance Epistemic ought-implies-can Deontic logic 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity College DublinDublinIreland

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