Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We refer to knowledge-that. An important paper that attempts to model defeat of knowledge-how is Carter and Navarro (2017).

  2. 2.

    Papers relevant to this debate are for instance Carey (2011), Cohen (2013), Comesana (2012), Feldman (2009), Kelly (2005, 2010), Matheson (2009), Rotondo (2013), Thune (2010) and Weatherson (2013).

  3. 3.

    To forestall possible confusion, the reader should keep it in mind that the expression ‘conservatism’ is used in very different ways, which not always conform to the dichotomy liberalism/conservatism, in current epistemology and even by the contributors to this special issue.

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Correspondence to Luca Moretti.

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Moretti, L., Piazza, T. Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue. Synthese 195, 2845–2854 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1551-4

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Keywords

  • Current Epistemology
  • Phenomenal Conservatism
  • Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology
  • Higher-order Evidence
  • Casullo