Abstract
In this paper I examine contemporary accounts of noninferential justification in light of what I take to be the Cartesian project of building epistemology on foundations made secure by the impossibility of error. I argue that familiar abstract arguments for foundationalism, by themselves, don’t seem to motivate Cartesianism. But I further argue that there is one version of foundationalism that is more closely linked to the way in which Descartes sought ideal knowledge.
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Notes
The interpretation of Descartes involves considerable debate. In a number of influential papers and books Sosa argues that one cannot understand Descartes properly without paying close attention to Descartes’s distinction between cognition (“animal”-level knowledge) and scientia (a more satisfying and intellectually demanding “reflective” knowledge). Sosa thinks that it is a mistake to suppose that we gain scientia by finding a secure foundation upon which we can build through legitimate inference. And he is inclined to think that Descartes agreed with him. See, for a representative example of this work, Sosa (1994). And Sosa’s interpretation of Descartes is only one of many. One reviewer of this manuscript wonders why I care whether I have interpreted correctly the “real” Descartes. Isn’t my primary interest that of trying to understand the intersection of various views whoever held them? This raises thorny metaphilosophical issues concerning the history of philosophy and its philosophical importance. It is important to read historically influential figures if for no other reason that they can give one insight into how to think about an issue. But on the other hand, the reviewer is probably correct that I don’t care that much whether or not my Descartes is the real Descartes. I wouldn’t be devastated if a resurrected Descartes rejected my interpretation of his views. Still my Descartes has influenced my thinking and I want to give credit where credit is due, even if the credit belongs to a figure constructed largely out of inferences I draw from the real Descartes’s writings.
It certainly seems to be a necessary truth. There are necessary truths that are not analytic, but when there is a recursive analysis that seems entirely plausible, I suggest that one look first to that analysis to explain the apparent necessity.
There are radical differences among foundationalists. But many different sorts of foundationalists should find attractive the idea that they need a recursive analysis of justification. See Goldman (1979) for a now classic statement of the position.
The regress arguments are, of course, both controversial. The coherentist famously rejects the idea that justification is “linear.” On one version of the view, each belief in a person’s belief system is justified in virtue of its coherence with the rest of the beliefs in the system. The relevant coherence can be understood in a number of different ways. But coherentists need to decide whether the mere existence of the relevant coherence is sufficient for justification or whether the believer needs also to be aware of the coherence. I have argued that the former view faces devastating counterexamples, while the latter leads to regress (Fumerton 1994). Klein defends infinitism, a view that rejects both the idea that there is foundational justification and the idea that we can get justification through coherence. In Fumerton (2014) I argue that the infinitist will fall prey to the conceptual regress argument. To avoid absurd consequences, the infinitist must argue that it is not the mere availability of infinitely many arguments that is relevant to justification, but the availability of infinitely many argments with premises for which one has justification. While Klein (2014) tries to avoid saying this, it seems to me that he only succeeds in using locutions that are clearly intended to capture the idea of epistemic justification.
The account gets revised to deal with objections. See again Goldman (1979).
See Huemer (2001) for an extended attempt to defend this sort of view.
See Fumerton (1988).
Philosophers such as Hume and Berkeley didn’t actual use the locution “direct awareness” or “direct acquaintance,” but Hume (1888, p. 212) did contrast perceptions with physical objects by suggesting that the former were “immediately present to us.” There is the exegetical worry that Hume didn’t want a self to be one of the relata of an awareness relation, but Hume himself eventually seemed to realize that he needed a self to give an account of how various perceptions belong to a single person. Berkeley (1954) didn’t talk about direct awareness or acquaintance either, but instead talked as if we perceive ideas (a terminology that is unfortunate given that the language of perception is most at home when describing our relation to physical objects. In any event, in the very first dialogue Berkeley (through Philonous) insisted that we characterize sensible things as things that are immediately perceived. I would argue that his concept of immediate perception just is the concept of direct acquaintance.
Let’s suppose for simplicity that we are talking about a sense datum that exemplifies phenomenal redness. I don’t think one can be acquainted at all with redness as a property of a physical object.
So on one classical model, we will also allow, for example, sentences, statements, and beliefs (among others) to be true or false. But a sentence or statement is true because it conventionally expresses a thought. A belief can be true because it is a species of thought. Everything with a truth value has that truth value only because a thought has the truth value.
I discuss various other solutions to the problem in Fumerton (2005).
References
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Fumerton, R. Cartesian epistemology and infallible justification. Synthese 195, 4671–4681 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1456-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1456-2