In this paper I consider the prospects for an epistemic norm which relates knowledge-how to showing in a way that parallels the knowledge norm of assertion. In the first part of the paper I show that this epistemic norm can be motivated by conversational evidence, and that it fits in with a plausible picture of the function of knowledge. In the second part of the paper I present a dilemma for this norm. If we understand showing in a broad sense as a general kind of skill teaching, then the norm faces counterexamples of teachers who know how to teach, but not to do. On the other hand, it we understand showing more narrowly as involving only teaching by doing the relevant activity, then the data which initially supported the norm can be explained away by more general connections between knowledge-how and intentional action.
KeywordsKnowledge-how Epistemic norms Assertion Showing Teaching
Thanks to Mark Bowker, Jessica Brown, Joshua Dever, Katherine Hawley, Matthew McGrath, Andrew Peet, Fenner Tanswell, Alexander Sandgren, Kieran Setiya, Caroline Toubourg, Brian Weatherson, and audiences at St Andrews and MIT. This research was supported by a UK Arts and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Scholarship.
- Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- Aoki, C. (2013). Do able-bodied people belong in para-sport? Retrieved February 9, 2017, from https://www.paralympic.org/blog/chuck-aoki-do-able-bodied-people-belong-para-sport#!prettyPhoto.
- Bach, K., & Harnish, R. M. (1979). Linguistic communication and speech acts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Beilock, S., Carr, T., MacMahon, C., & Starkes, L. (2002). When paying attention becomes counterproductive: Impact of divided versus skill-focused attention on novice and experienced performance of sensorimotor skills. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8(1), 6–16.Google Scholar
- British Gymnastics. (2017). Gynmast profiles. Retrieved September 2, 2017, from https://www.british-gymnastics.org/gymnast-profiles.
- Brogaard, B. (2011). Knowledge-how: A unified account. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (Eds.), Knowing how: Essays on knowledge, mind, and action (pp. 136–160). Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
- Brown, T., & Carr, T. (1989). Automaticity in skill acquisition: Mechanisms for reducing interference in concurrent performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 15, 686–700.Google Scholar
- Brownstein, M., & Michaelson, E. (2015). Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution. Synthese Advance. doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0888-9.
- Carr, D. (1981). Knowledge in practice. American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53–61.Google Scholar
- Cath, Y. (2011). Knowing how without knowing that. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (Eds.), Knowing how: Essays on knowledge, mind, and action (pp. 113–135). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Craig, E. (1990). Knowledge and the state of nature: An essay in conceptual synthesis. Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
- Ericsson, K. (2006). The influence of experience and deliberate practice on the development of superior expert practice. In K. Ericsson, N. Charness, P. Feltovich, & R. Hoffman (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert performance (pp. 683–704). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Ford, P., Coughlan, E., Hodges, N., & Williams, A. (2015). Deliberate practice in sport. In J. Baker & D. Farrow (Eds.), Routledge handbook of sports expertise (pp. 347–362). Routledge: Abingdon.Google Scholar
- Glick, E. (2012). Abilities and know-how attributions. In J. Brown & M. Gerken (Eds.), Knowledge ascriptions. Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
- Habgood-Coote, J. (unpublished manuscript) Knowledge-how is the norm of intention.Google Scholar
- Hawley, K. (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, 19–31.Google Scholar
- Hawley, K. (2011). Knowing how and epistemic injustice. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (Eds.), Knowing how: Essays on knowledge, mind, and action (pp. 283–299). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- HipBoneMusic. (2016). Bone2Pick: Julie Landsman Interview [online video]. Retrieved February 9, 2017, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SHuuo7SJ69M
- Hornsby, J. (1980). Actions. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
- Karttunen, L. (1978). Syntax and semantics of questions. In H. Hiz (Ed.), Questions (pp. 165–210). Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
- Landsman, J. (2014). Carmine Caruso method: Introduction with Julie Landsman [online video]. Retrieved February 9, 2017, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdSShjFHqDk.
- Maine Suzuki School. (n.d.). Getting Started with Suzuki. Retrieved February 9, 2017, from https://mainesuzukiviolin.com/lessons/.
- McKenna, R. (2013). ‘Knowledge’ ascriptions. Social Roles and Semantics. Episteme, 10(4), 335–350.Google Scholar
- Moore, A. (1997). Points of view. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Pelling, C. (2013). Assertion and safety. Synthese, 190(17), 3777–3796.Google Scholar
- Poston, T. (2015). Know how to transmit knowledge? Noûs Advance. doi: 10.1111/nous.12125.
- Reynolds, S. (2002). Testimony. Knowledge and Epistemic Goals, Philosophical Studies, 110, 139–161.Google Scholar
- Ryle, G. (1971). Thinking and self-teaching. Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 5(2), 228, 216–228.Google Scholar
- Ryle, G. (2009). Teaching and training. In Collected papers (Vol. 2, pp. 464–447). Abingdon: Routledge.Google Scholar
- Turri, J. (2013). Knowledge and suberogatory assertion. Philosophical Studies, 167, 1–11.Google Scholar
- Turri, J. (2014). You gotta believe. In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (Eds.), Epistemic norms: New essays on action, belief, and assertion (pp. 193–198). Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
- Williams, B. (1973). Deciding to Believe. Problems of the self: Philosophical papers 1956–1972 (pp. 136–151). Cambridge: CUP.Google Scholar
- Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar