Notes
We are grateful for the external referees who accepted the task of reviewing (sometimes multiple) iterations of submissions and resubmissions, for the professional editorial staff of Synthese who were very patient in guiding us through this project from its conception to publication, and for the editors-in-chief, Otávio Bueno, Wiebe van der Hoek, and—especially—Gila Sher who agreed that the project was worthy of a special issue in Synthese.
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Ulatowski, J., Wright, C. Minimalism about truth: special issue introduction. Synthese 195, 927–933 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1376-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1376-1